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Essays on Sustainable Development and Agricultural Risk Management
Xiaojie Zhang
Few sectors of the economy are as influential to the environment and are as sus-
ceptible to the influence of environmental changes as agriculture. This dissertation
contains three chapters that examine agriculture as the primary interface at which
human and nature interact. Primarily, I explore how policy support for financial risk
management tools can have substantial impact on agricultural production choices
via moral hazard and selection problems. While mitigating agricultural production
risk, these supports also impact the environment via induced change in production
choices. This dissertation contributes to U.S. agriculture policy and pollution man-
agement literature and insurance literature on moral hazard and selection problems.
By examining the case of Federal Crop Insurance Program in the United States, this
dissertation explores input choice changes caused by changes in government support
for crop insurance. I proposed theoretical mechanism through which increasing use
of financial risk management strategy can influence input decisions with risk implica-
tions, and tested these theories empirically with county-level panel data. Empirical
tests showed that there were substantial decreases in irrigation investment and fertil-
izer application due to crop insurance offering. Policy implications on water scarcity
and non-point source pollution management and on federal support to crop insurance
market are discussed.
Table of Contents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables vi
Acknowledgments viii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Chapter Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Crop Insurance in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Moral Hazard: Missing Irrigation in the Federal Crop Insurance
Program 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Ex Ante Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Irrigation as Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
i
2.3.2 Farmer’s Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Model Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 Main Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Validity of the Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Data and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.1 Irrigation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects in Corn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6.4 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3 What Works for Agriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Reduction?
63
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2.1 Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation . . . . . . 67
3.2.2 Fertilizer Application and Crop Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.2 Farmer’s Optimization Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3.3 Model Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 Data and Descriptive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
ii
3.6 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.1 First-stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.2 Second-stage Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Conclusion and Policy Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4 Introducing Index Insurance into Traditional Insurance Markets:
Advantageous Selection and Reversal of Moral Hazard 97
4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.1.1 Selection in Insurance Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.1.2 Group Insurance in the Federal Crop Insurance Program . . . 99
4.2 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.2 Optimization with Group Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2.3 Group Insurance as an Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2.4 Predictions at the County Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.3 Empirical Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.2 Difference-in-difference Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3.3 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115




2.3.1 Estimation of Crop Production Function C(.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.1 Insurance Response to FCIRA of 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.2 Input and Output Prices (1985 - 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.3 Weather in the Corn Belt (1981 - 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.1 Irrigation Expansion from 1982 tp 2007 for Corn . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6.1 Relative Variance of Precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6.2 Spatial Distribution of Initial Irrigation Status and Major Aquifer . . 62
2.6.3 Scale of Production for Corn and Soybean 1982-2007 . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 Optimal Fertilizer Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.1 Spatial Distribution of Average N and P Fertilizer Use (1987-2006) . 80
3.5.1 Fertilizer Use and Crop Insurance Enrollment 1987-2006 . . . . . . . 87
3.6.1 Change of Fertilizer Use and Crop Insurance Enrollment around Policy 91
4.2.1 Received Yields with Optimal Fertilizer Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3.1 Phase-in of Group-based Insurance Plan (1997-2000) . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.2 Temporal Heterogeneous Impact of Group Insurance as an Alternative 118
4.3.3 Group Insurance Enrollment in Event Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
iv
4.3.4 Individual and Group Insurance Enrollment 1989-2006 . . . . . . . . 121
v
List of Tables
1.1 History of Federal Crop Insurance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Descriptive Statistics - Corn in All Producing Counties . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Descriptive Statistics - Soybean in All Producing Counties . . . . . . 34
2.3 Irrigation Response to Crop Insurance: Corn Belt Analysis for Corn . 39
2.4 Irrigation Response to Crop Insurance: Corn Belt Analysis for Soybean 40
2.5 Irrigation Response to Crop Insurance: Corn Belt Analysis for Corn
and Soybean Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6 Robustness Check for Irrigation Response to Crop Insurance: Weighted
by Average Planted Acre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Robustness Check for Irrigation Response to Crop Insurance: Not
Weighted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8 Heterogeneous Effects: Corn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.9 Summary of Sub-sample Analysis: Corn (weighted) . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Empirical Studies on Crop Insurance and Chemical Use . . . . . . . . 71
3.2 Summary Statistics of Key Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 First Stage: Crop Insurance Enrollment Response to FCIRA . . . . . 90
vi
3.4 Second Stage: Impact of Crop Insurance Enrollment on Fertilizer Use 93
4.1 Summary Statistics of Key Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.2 Static Impact of Introducing Group Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 Temporal Heterogeneous Impact of Group Insurance as an Alternative 119
vii
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for all my defense committee members, John Mutter, Geoffrey Heal, Ray
Weil, Wolfram Schlenker, Dan Osgood. Thank you all so much for being generous
with your time and your intellectual power.
Thanks McKinsey & Company for offering me a job that gives me hope and
confidence that I am employable in fields other than research. Thanks for pushing
me to finish what I am started and for being flexible with the time line.
Thanks Dr. Weil for being my mentor and my friend. Thanks for taking me on a
road trip to the heart of the Corn Belt for research, and for the life wisdom that you
have shared. Thanks for telling me that I will find my calling despite my self-doubt.
Thanks Nathaniel Boggs for being supportive and light-hearted when I am dis-
couraged about research or panic about my future. You are the best roommate anyone
can ever ask for.
Thanks Professor Geoffrey Heal for taking me the last minute. I would not have
made it without his kindness, support and generosity.
Thanks Andrew Hews’ team at Pacific College of Oriental Medicine. You guys
have been way more than acupuncturists for me. You listened to me, supported me,
trusted me, encouraged me when I was in my dark little hole, not approachable by
most of my loved ones. And I forgive you for betting on my relationship status and
employment status.
Thanks Wenqi Hu for being a good friend and a huge helper in every way possible.
These regressions would not have been there without your generosity of research
resource and your intellectual power.
Thanks my poor parents for putting up with me all these years. Thanks for being
proud of me even when I am not proud of myself. Thanks for showing me love in all
the ways that you know. Thanks for loving each other and for being happy when I
am not with you. Thanks for taking care of my grandparents when I am not there.
Thanks all loneliness and misery this Ph.D. program has made me experience.
What did not kill me has made me stronger.
I have not loved the work as much as I have hoped, but I have loved many people
I met in the past five years more than I thought I would. So thank you all who have
crossed path with me during my PhD years. I might not have been the best self when






Few sectors of the economy are as influential to the environment and are as susceptible
to the influence of environmental changes as agriculture. While the advancement
of agricultural technology has significantly improved agricultural outputs over time,
increasing drought threats and price uncertainty has created increasing demand for
farm risk management in the US (Shields, 2015). In 2012, more than 80 percent of corn
production region in the US under drought threats according to U.S. drought monitor
classification (Hoerling et al., 2013). Meanwhile, water scarcity and agricultural non-
point source pollution had become an ever-increasing problem as a consequence of
climate change and emerging competing demand from various sectors (James, 2003;
EPA, 2009; Schaible and Aillery, 2012).
The quest for a sustainable and environmentally friendly way of farming and sup-
porting rural livelihood has been ongoing for decades in the United States, and the
effort of supporting agricultural production risk has shifted from ad hoc disaster re-
lief programs to a more market-driven crop insurance program, the Federal Crop
Insurance Program (FCIP). The FCIP is by far the largest Federal Program that
provides direct support to farmers. As of 2014, FCIP carries a total liability in excess
of 110 billion and insures 294 million acres with approximately 62 percent of total
premium paid into the insurance pool covered by federal subsidies (Shields, 2015). In
the drought year of 2012, the program cost peaked at $14.1 billion and is projected
to cost $90 billion from 2013 to 2022 (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). Currently,
the program is administrated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Risk
Management Agency (RMA) and offers protection for yield or revenue losses for about
130 crops. All policies are sold and completely serviced through 18 approved private
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Table 1.1: History of Federal Crop Insurance Program
• 1938, the Federal Crop Insurance Program was established to help agriculture
recover from the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl.
• 1980, the Federal Crop Insurance Act expanded crop insurance to more crops
and regions.
• 1994, the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act authorized fully subsidized catas-
trophic (CAT) coverage and made participation mandatory.
• 2000, the Agricultural Risk Protection Act increased subsidies for most buy-up
level1.
insurance companies with losses re-insured by USDA and administrative and oper-
ating cost reimbursed by the federal government. Farmers purchase crop insurance
with subsidies and indemnity payments are triggered whenever yield or price real-
izations fall below selected guaranteed level. Table 1.1 lists major events in the the
development of FCIP.
Moral Hazard describes reduced effort in taking precaution when enrolled in insur-
ance because the cost of precaution is fully born by the insurance policy holder while
the benefit of precaution is shared with the insurer (Association, 2013). Selection
problem describes self-selection into insurance contracts because the policy holder
has private information on their risk exposure and risk preference which can not be
utilized in designing insurance contracts (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011; Association,
2013). Both moral hazard and selection problems are ubiquitous in insurance mar-
kets, and crop insurance in the United States is not an exception. This dissertation
examines crop insurance and input choice distortions induced by crop insurance and
discusses the environmental impact of these distortions.
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Theoretical work on whether agricultural inputs should be viewed as risky inputs
or some self-insurance mechanism is inconclusive, thus calls for empirical evidences.
Chapters in this dissertation are empirical studies with conceptual frameworks gener-
ating testable hypotheses using county-level panel data sets. The empirical strategies
in the chapters take advantage of federal policy changes, which are presented in sec-
tion 1.3. Chapter 2 studies responses of irrigation to the increasing of crop insurance,
which gives an example of an input that is risk-reducing by nature and requires sig-
nificant fixed cost. Chapter 3 studies responses of fertilizer to the increasing in crop
insurance, which gives an example of an input that is ambiguous in its risk nature
and is driven by marginal cost.
1.2 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2 Moral Hazard: Missing Irrigation in the Federal Crop Insurance
Program Chapter 2 explores the interaction between the primary risk management
field practice irrigation and the financial risk management tool of crop insurance. A
theoretical model that treats irrigation as a fix-cost investment with variable cost
to apply and irrigation water supply as perfect complementarity to natural rain fall,
predicts that irrigation investment will decrease as crop insurance is made available
with heavy premium subsidies. Intuitively, federal support to crop insurance would
crowd-out private risk reduction practice. Extensive margin of irrigation is measured
by percentage of land with irrigation, representing long-term irrigation investment,
and is the main outcome of interests. To overcome the endogeneity of insurance
enrollment, this chapter takes advantage of the policy change in 1994 to instrument for
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the endogenous variable crop insurance, using instrumental variable (IV) regression on
a county-level panel of corn producing counties in the United States. The Federal Crop
Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 authorized a fully subsidized coverage level for
major crops and boosted crop insurance enrollment dramatically in the United States.
Instrumental Variable approach is used to estimate how much change in irrigation
behavior is caused by the exogenous increase in crop insurance enrollment induced by
the FCIRA of 1994. I found that irrigation use decreased by 4.42% in corn production
in the Corn Belt in response to crop insurance enrollment, while the response in
soybean production is insignificant. The difference in irrigation responses to crop
insurance enrollment between soybean and corn are largely attributed to the difference
in their water stress sensitivity. This substantive relationship between irrigation use
and crop insurance can alleviate some concerns of increasing overall production risk
due to less federal support in crop insurance. This implies that reducing government
support for crop insurance may have less impact on farm business risk than expected
and reduced crop insurance subsidies have the potential to partially restore farmers
incentives to take precautions via field practices.
Chapter 3 What Works for Agriculture Nonpoint Source Pollution Re-
duction? Chapter 3 joins the non-point source pollution regulation discussion and
examines whether economic incentives provided by crop insurance subsidies alter fer-
tilizer application decisions in the direction with environmental benefits. The model
predicts that farmers regularly apply more fertilizer than optimal in a given year to
take advantage of yield gains in the few years with favorable weather conditions, and
that the long-term optimal fertilizer application level reduces with crop insurance,
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thus creating environmental externalities. Intuitively, farmers use “insurance appli-
cation” of fertilizer at their own full expenses to achieve exceptional good yields and
profits to make up for losses in bad years to sustain long-term profitability. With
insurance covering the loss in very bad years, such incentive is reduced, resulting in
a reduced the long-term optimal fertilizer level. Empirically, this study finds that a
reduction in fertilizer use was achieved as we seeks to reduce systemic production risk
in agriculture via crop insurance. An Instrumental variable (IV) approach was used
taking advantage of the exogenous shocks on crop insurance enrollment induced by
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 and the differential response
to the policy due to past extreme heat shocks. The study finds that counties in the
Corn Belt where cropland is dominated by corn and soybean production showed an
18.5% decrease in commercial nitrogen (N) fertilizer use. No significant change in
phosphorus (P) fertilizer application was found. The difference in behavior responses
between N and P is expected and can be explained by the natural process of N and
P in the soil and history of nutrients management in the Corn Belt. These find-
ings suggest that public programs that alter economic incentives can have significant
knock-on effects on agricultural non-point source pollution. Further, effective design
of economic incentive programs in regulating agricultural NPS pollution should be
rooted in understanding natural process of the pollutants in the ecosystem.
Chapter 4 Introducing Index Insurance in Traditional Insurance Markets:
Advantageous Selection and Reversal of Moral Hazard Chapter 4 investi-
gates the impact of introducing an index insurance contracts that are based on county
averages instead of individual outcomes on the traditional insurance markets. This
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study shows theoretically that introducing index insurance to a traditional insurance
market can induce advantageous selection of low risk individual into group insurance,
leaving the traditional insurance pool more risky, while behavior distortion due to
moral hazard induced by incentives from traditional insurance contracts can be re-
versed. Empirically, this paper takes advantage of the fact that crop insurance plans
based on county average yields were introduced to counties at various points in time
in the Federal Crop Insurance Program in the United States to construct treatment
and control group for difference-in-difference approach. This study finds that indi-
vidual insurance enrollment decrease by 5% when group crop insurance whose payout
is based on county average yields were offered as an alternative to individual yield
based insurance contracts. This implies that among farmers who signed up for the
individual insurance when group insurance was not available, 5% of them are of suf-
ficiently low risk and could benefit from basis risk because their yields are likely to
be above average in a bad year. Combined with the finding that nitrogen fertilizer
use decreased 18% when farmers are enrolled in individual insurance plan with heavy
subsidized premium, fertilizer use is expected to increase about 1%, yet the empirical
results are not statistically significant. The findings of this paper call attention to
a selection problem when a new type of insurance contract is brought into policy
holders choice set.
1.3 Crop Insurance in the United States
The United States Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) was established by the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (P.L. 75-430) with three objectives in mind, “(a)
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to protect the income of farmers against crop failure or price collapse; (b) to protect
consumers against shortage of food supplies and extreme of prices; and (c) to assist
business and employment by providing an even flow of farm supplies and establish
stable farm buying power.” As an initial experiment to help with the recovery from
the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, FCIP only covers few major crops in limited
major production regions at its establishment. Not until the passage of the Federal
Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365), the program expanded crop insurance to
more crops and regions in the country. However, participation rates remained low
and the losses ratio remained high.
The Federal Crop Insurance Program gained tremendous momentum in recent
decades, following Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of 1994 (P.L. 103-
354). With the goal of eliminating ad hoc disaster relief programs, the FCIRA of
1994 authorized a new catastrophic (CAT) coverage to insure producers against ma-
jor losses at no cost to producers and made enrollment in crop insurance a prerequisite
to other government benefits. Subsidies were also provided to higher levels of coverage
with decreasing subsidy rates as coverage increases. Participation in crop insurance
soared with the enact of this policy, and remained well above the targeted 50% par-
ticipation rate even after the mandatory enrollment requirement was dropped after
one year. This sudden increase in crop insurance enrollment provides the foundation
of empirical strategies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in identifying causality between
crop insurance and production input choices.
To encourage crop insurance for higher coverage level, the Agricultural Risk Pro-
tection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-224) increased premium subsidies for “buy-up” policies.
Participation increased further following the 2000 Act, and over 70% were enrolled
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at 70% or higher coverage by 2011. In addition, the role of the private sector was
expanded. With partnering authorization, private entities can participate in research
and development of new insurance products and receive reimbursement for research if
the product was approved by RMA. The period between 1996 and 2000 are without
major changes in FCIP and was studied in Chapter 4 to generate insights on the
impact of introducing group insurance on the traditional insurance pool.
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Chapter 2
Moral Hazard: Missing Irrigation




Ex ante moral hazard is ubiquitous in insurance markets. The incentive for managing
risk is compromised when the full cost of an adverse event and the full benefit of pre-
caution are not born by the insured individual but are shared with the insurer, thus
leading to reduced precautions under imperfect monitoring. While empirical evidence
of ex ante moral hazard has been documented in auto insurance (Cohen and Dehejia,
2004), health insurance (Dave and Kaestner, 2009), and workers’ compensation in-
surance markets (Ruster, 1991; Fortin and Lanoie, 2000), little has been documented
in the federal crop insurance scheme in the United States.
Federal Crop Insurance Program is the largest government subsidized insurance
program, with a budget allocation of 89.8 billion in the 2014 Farm Bill. Annan and
Schlenker (2015) documented moral hazard from the viewpoint of crop yields, but did
not reveal the behavior channel through which the withdrawal of precaution occurs.
This study aims to explore how the application of field risk management practice was
changed in the presence of crop insurance with a focus on irrigation.
Irrigation is not only an important input in crop production, but has also been
identified as the most important risk management strategies with significant impact
on water conservation (Boggess et al., 1983). This study focuses on irrigation use in
response to crop insurance adoption and seeks to test whether ex ante moral hazard
is present in the Federal Crop Insurance Program. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first study that studies irrigation in the context of risk management and
identifies causality between crop insurance and irrigation use.
To study the risk management nature of irrigation use in the events of drought,
I developed a conceptual framework emphasizing the complementarity of natural
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precipitation and irrigation in crop production in the presence of yield insurance. The
model predicts that increasing insurance coverage leads to a decrease in the use of
irrigation. This prediction is verified by the empirical tests using irrigation data from
the Census of Agriculture and Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
combined with crop insurance data from United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Risk Management Agent (RMA) from 1982 to 2007.
One main empirical challenge of evaluating the impact of crop insurance on irri-
gation use is the endogeneity of these two decisions. This paper takes advantage of
the policy change in 1994 to instrument for the endogenous variable crop insurance,
using instrumental variable (IV) regression on a county-level panel of corn producing
counties in the United States. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of
1994 authorized a fully subsidized coverage level for major crops and boosted crop
insurance enrollment dramatically in the United States. IV approach is used to esti-
mate the how much change in irrigation behavior is caused by the exogenous increase
in crop insurance enrollment induced by the FCIRA of 1994.
The post 1994 dummy is a valid instrument because it satisfies both the relevance
requirement and the exclusion restriction. It is relevant because the net acre enrolled
in crop insurance increased 102% for corn and 164% for soybean and the take-up
rate measured by percentage planted acre insured increased from 13.9% to 30.0% for
corn and from 10.5% to 30.0% for soybean from 1994 to 1995 (see Figure 2.4.1). In
addition, examination of changes in policy, commodity prices, weather and technology
during the study period show limited concerns for violating the exclusion restriction.
The study presents strong evidence for ex ante moral hazard in the form of with-
drawing precaution practice of irrigation across corn producing counties in the United
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States. It shows that irrigation use decreased by 4.42% in corn production in the Corn
Belt in response to crop insurance enrollment, while response in soybean production
did not significantly change. These results are robust when expanding the sample
to some wider geographic region. Heterogeneous effects are examined via sub-sample
analysis and reviewed that ex ante moral hazard is less severe when the cost of precau-
tion is low or the benefit of precaution is high. The difference in irrigation responses
to crop insurance enrollment between soybean and corn are largely attributed to their
physiological differences, particularly, their water stress sensitivity.
The findings of this paper are important contributions to the literature on ex ante
moral hazard. They provide direct evidence that insurance deters precaution in the
context of crop insurance market. This paper also contributes to the literature on
the U.S. agricultural policy. It highlights another knock-on effect of promoting crop
insurance using federal premium subsidies. These findings have important policy im-
plications in this transitional time when the federal government is cutting premium
subsidies for the crop insurance program. Empirical evidence of the substantive re-
lationship between irrigation use and crop insurance can alleviate some concerns of
increasing overall production risk due to less federal support in crop insurance. This
implies that reducing government support for crop insurance may have less impact
on farm business risk than expected and reduced crop insurance subsidies have the
potential to partially restore farmers’ incentives to take precautions via field practices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 2.2 provides background on
ex ante moral hazard, farm risk management, and the history of the Federal Crop
Insurance Program. Section 2.3 details a theoretical framework with a prediction
that increasing crop insurance coverage leads to reduced use of irrigation. Section
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2.4 outlines the empirical strategy and shows the validity of using post 1994 dummy
as instrument. Section 2.5 describes the data and section 2.6 presents the empirical
results and discussions. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Ex Ante Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets
Ex ante moral hazard is ubiquitous in insurance markets. It is defined as a change
of behaviors prior to a random event in response to a change in the risk of losses
(Association, 2013). An individual facing the risk of an accident, such as a car
accident, an illness, or a failure of crop, can generally take precaution to reduce the
risk. The incentive for managing risk would be optimal when individuals internalize
the full cost and benefit of risk management in the absence of insurance. Incentive for
risk management is compromised when an individual bear full cost but only partial
benefit in the presence of insurance. Pauly (1974a), Marshall (1976), Holmstrom
(1979), and Shavell (1979) showed that insurance reduces the incentive to take care
when the insurer is unable to monitor the insureds action. Theoretically, while ex
ante moral hazard can be eliminated with perfectly specified levels of precautions
in the contracts or with behavior monitoring, insurance contracts are almost never
complete and behavior monitoring is usually costly and imperfect.
A substantial amount of empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard is found in
many major insurance markets, where increase of insurance coverage leads to a signif-
icant reduction in the prevention and an increase in accidents (Chiappori, 2000). For
example, incidence of lost workday injuries and illness is found to be associated with
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a more generous worker’s compensation insurance (Ruster, 1991; Fortin and Lanoie,
2000). Cohen and Dehejia (2004) provided well-identified evidence that automobile
insurance leads to ex ante moral hazard of increasing auto fatalities using a natural
experiment of compulsory auto insurance laws. Moreover, Dave and Kaestner (2009)
identified that reduction in prevention and increase in unhealthy behaviors among
elderly men is the result of obtaining Medicare at age 65.
Similar to auto insurance, health insurance and worker’s compensation insurance
markets, agricultural insurance is also subject to ex ante moral hazard effects. Mo-
tivated by environmental concurs of changes in chemical and fertilizer use induced
by crop insurance adoption, Ramaswami (1993) theorized input responses under gen-
erally specified crop insurance contract and predicted that, for a single input model
with non-increasing absolute risk aversion, the effect of actuarially fair crop insurance
is to reduce risk-reducing input, and that the effect on risk increasing input cannot be
established analytically. This result concurs with ex ante moral hazard theory that
crop insurance may disincentify precautions. Empirical evidence of input responses
to crop insurance, which largely focused on chemical and fertilizer use because of their
impact on water quality, is in dispute with mixed evidence. Horowitz and Lichtenberg
(1993) found a significant increase in chemical and fertilizer use with insurance adop-
tion, contradicting the theory of moral hazard, while Smith and Goodwin (1996) and
Babcock and Hennessy (1996) found the opposite. It is worth noting that all these
early studies used cross-sectional data and are subject to endogenous bias. Only re-
cently, Annan and Schlenker (2015) explored county-level panel data and showed that
U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program discouraged adaptation against extreme heat.
They found a higher sensitive to extreme heat in corn and soybean yields with crop
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insurance subsidies. However, such yield responses does not provide direct insights
on behavior distortion channels via which ex ante moral hazard occurs. This study
provides evidence of ex ante moral hazard that occurs through withdrawing irrigation.
2.2.2 Irrigation as Risk Management
Irrigation has been identified as one of the most important risk management strate-
gies, given the essential role of water in agricultural production systems (Boggess
et al., 1983). Irrigation can effectively mitigate adverse effects of inadequate precipi-
tation as well as extreme heat. It impacts not only the potential level of harm arising
from an extreme weather event, such as crop failure due to drought, but also the
likelihood of such event occurring. In the semi-arid and arid regions, irrigation is an
essential component of agricultural systems, while in the humid region, supplemental
irrigation is becoming increasingly important as a risk management strategy. Dalton
et al. (2004) compared economic benefits of federal crop insurance and supplemental
irrigation in a humid region in the United States and found that crop insurance is
inefficient at reducing producer exposure to weather risks while the benefits of supple-
mental irrigation are significant in situations with low average fixed cost of acquiring
irrigation systems.
Increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change
(IPCC 2007) is placing rising pressure on risk management in agribusiness. However,
the expected increasing concern of water scarcity may limit the risk management
potential of irrigation, as irrigation accounts for 80-90 percent of consumptive water
use in the United States and competing demands and awareness of social value of
water quality is on the rise (Schaible and Aillery, 2012). In response to increasing
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demand for agribusiness risk management, financial instruments, such as indemnity
crop insurance, index insurance, and weather derivatives are being developed and
adopted in many parts of the world to ease the overall level of risks.
While it is understood that factors such as land allocation, soil characteristics,
water price, and risk attitude (Torkamani and Shajari, 2008) influence irrigation
adoption, little attention has been given to the influence of financial risk management
strategies on irrigation. Foudi and Erdlenbruch (2012) found a significant negative
correlation between yield insurance and irrigation adoption, suggesting the presence
of an ex ante moral hazard among French corn producers. In this paper, I developed a
conceptual framework that focuses on irrigation and stochastic weather events with an
emphasis on the complementarity of natural precipitation and irrigation and provides
empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard among U.S. corn producing counties. To
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine the causal link between
crop insurance and irrigation use.
There has been some studies on FCIP in the literature. Early studies were most
concerned with low participation rates in FCIP and examined various drivers of in-
surance enrollment. Knight and Coble (1997) conducted an extensive survey of U.S.
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance literate between 1980 and 1997. After the vast expan-
sion of FCIP in 1994, empirical studies emerged investigating the impact of FCIRA on
land use changes and production practices. Greater growth in program crop produc-
tion, farm sizes and total sales were found in FCIP participants than nonparticipants
(Key et al., 2005). More marginal land with limited crop suitability were brought into
production (Claassen et al., 2005), off-farm labor (Key et al., 2006; Negri et al., 2005)
and enterprise diversification (O’Donoghue et al., 2009) decreased. Impact of FCRIA
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on conservation was also examined, but little change on soil erosion was confirmed
to be causal to FCIRA (Goodwin and Smith, 2003). These findings that precau-
tion farming practices and family income hedging practices were withdrawn following
FCRIA suggest the existence of ex ante moral hazard effects. This study contributes
to the public policy literature on FCIP, demonstrating the impact of FCRIA on irri-
gation behaviors.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
To demonstrate how economic incentives offered by crop insurance may change irriga-
tion investment choice, a simple model of yield insurance is presented, with a concave
yield function and rainfall following a discrete probability function. Subsection 2.3.1
presents key assumptions on 1) insurance payout structure, 2) yield response func-
tion, 3) natural rainfall distribution, and 4) irrigation cost structure. Subsection 2.3.2
lists an individual farmer’s expected profits under four combinations of insurance and
irrigation choices, and conditions under which investing in irrigation would be opti-
mal. Subsection 2.3.3 derives predictions of impact of crop insurance availability on
irrigation investment at the county level.
2.3.1 Model Setup
Suppose a farmer purchase a yield insurance with insured yield X that cost g(X),
where g(X) is monotonic increasing with X and g(X) = 0 when X = 0. There are
two possible outcomes in respect of indemnity payment. If the realized yield y is less
than the coverage X, insurance pays for the difference X − y. In this state of the
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world, the farmer receives revenue V1 = X, where the output price is normalized to
one. If the realized yield y is greater or equal to the coverage X, insurance does not
payout and the farmer receives revenue R2 = Y (N, r). Therefore, his actual revenue
V will be
V (r) =
 X if y < Xy if y ≥ X (2.1)
where y is the realized yield that follows y = Y (.) and output price is normalized
to 1. If realized yield y is less than the insured yield X, the insurance pays for the
difference; and if the realized yield y is greater than the insured yield X, insurance
does not pay. At minimal coverage level X, crop insurance is fully subsidized by the
government and cost farmers only small administrative fees.
The yield function y = Y (i, r) takes two inputs, with i representing irrigation
water application that bears no marginal cost and r representing natural precipitation.
Here water from irrigation and from natural precipitation are assumed be perfectly
substitutes, thus y = Y (i, r) can be written as
y = Y (i, r) = g(i+ r) (2.2)
where single input function g(.) satisfies:
1. Nothing can be produced when there is no water: g(0) = 0.
2. There is an optimal level of water r∗ that maximize yield at Y : max g(.) =
g(r∗)Y and y = g(.) ∈ [0, Y ].
3. When water is limited, yield increases as water increases: g′(r) > 0 if r < r∗.
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4. Yield response to water become negative when there is too much water: g′(r) >
0 if r <= r∗.
5. Marginal increase of yield decreases before water input reaches optimal r∗ and
marginal decrease of yield increases after water input reaches optimal r∗: g′′(.) <
0.
Natural precipitation r is stochastic and follows a discrete probability density
function f(r), where f(r) is
f(r) =

RH with probability p
RL with probability q
RM with probability 1− p− q
(2.3)
with 0 < p < 1, 0 < p < 1,0 < p + q < 1, and 0 < R ≤ RL < RM < RH ≤ R.
There are three possible states of the world. With probability p, weather will be
very favorable with abundant rainfall RH , in which condition y = g(RH) = YH ;
with probability q, there will be a drought with very limited rainfall RL, in which
condition y = g(RL = YL); with probability 1 − p − q, weather will be normal with
rainfall around the average level RM , in which condition y = g(RM) = YM .
Therefore, without irrigation i = 0, g(.) can be written as
y = g(i+ r) =

YH with probability p
YL with probability q
YM with probability 1− p− q
(2.4)
Irrigation is assumed to be a fixed-cost only long-term investment. The investment
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cost is spread across time in the form of annual mortgage payment C. Variable cost
associated with the use of irrigation water is w per inch. Farmers can achieve optimal
yield Y by using r∗ − r irrigation water with total variable cost of w(r∗ − r) in year
when natural rainfall is below optimal. Here r is the realized natural precipitation in
any given year. While these assumption on irrigation seems to be strong at the first
glance, it is a good presentation of irrigation investment and irrigation water prices in
the Corn Belt in the United States. The main cost of irrigation in the Corn Belt are
the investment costs for accessand energy cost for pumping water. Irrigation water
prices are typically not set in a market. Instead, water rights are administrated by
the states and rights of use are granted, not auctioned, to individuals without charge,
except for small administrative fees.
2.3.2 Farmer’s Choices
Each individual farmer faces four choices regarding combinations of whether to invest
in irrigation and whether to enroll in crop insurance.
Without Irrigation With Irrigation
Without Insurance I II
With Insurance III IV
Condition I When crop insurance is not available, and if a farmer choose not to
use irrigation to mitigation low yields when realized rainfalls are not favorable, the
expected profit is the expected yield give f(r), which is the expected value of equation
2.4:
EI = pYH + qYL + (1− p− q)YM (2.5)
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Condition II When crop insurance is not available, and if a farmer choose to invest
in irrigation with a fixed annual cost of C, thus is able to use irrigation to mitigation
low yields when realized rainfalls are less than the optimal r∗. The farmer can always
achieve the optimal yield Y at with additional variable cost, thus an expected profit
of:
EII = Y − C − w[p(r∗ −RH) + (1− p− q)(r∗ −RM) + q(r∗ −RL)] (2.6)
Condition III When crop insurance is available, and if a farmer choose not to
use irrigation to mitigation low yields when realized rainfalls are not favorable, the
expected profit is the expected yield give f(r), which is the expected value of equation
2.4 with realized revenue being the insurance coverage X when low rainfall RL is
realized with probability q:
EIII = pYH + qX + (1− p− q)YM (2.7)
Condition IV When crop insurance is available and an irrigation system has already
been installed, farmer will turn on irrigation only if the expected increase in yield due
to irrigation is greater than the variable cost of irrigation. Therefore, his expected
profit will be:
EIV = (1− q)Y + qX − C − wp(r∗ −RL)− w(1− p− q)(r∗ −RM) (2.8)
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Irrigation Choice For an individual farmer, where C is given, he would choose to
invest in irrigation when crop insurance is not available, if EI ≤ EII, in other words,
if
C ≤ BnoIns (2.9)
holds, where BnoIns = Y − pYH − qYL − (1 − p − q)YM − w[p(r∗ − RH) + (1 − p −
q)(r∗ − RM) + q(r∗ − RL)]. And he would choose to invest in irrigation when crop
insurance is available, if EIII ≤ EIV, in other words, if
C ≤ BIns (2.10)
holds, where BIns = Y −pYH−qX−(1−p−q)YM−w[p(r∗−RH)+(1−p−q)(r∗−RM)].
If Y −wq(r∗−RL)−X > 0, then BIns < BnoIns. Farmers would make the fixed cost
investment in irrigation.
2.3.3 Model Predictions
Equation 2.9 and equation 2.10 describe conditions under which an individual farmer
with annual mortgage payment C for irrigation system would choose to invest in irri-
gation. At the county-level, the level of irrigation investment, measured by the faction
of cropland with irrigation (see section 2.5 for details), depends on the distribution
of C and factors determining f(r) and g(.).
For any given f(r) and g(.), farmers whose annual mortgage payments is C < BIns
would not irrigate regardless of insurance availability, and farmer whose C > BnoIns
would always irrigate regardless of insurance availability. However, farmers whose
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annual mortgage payments C for irrigation system are between BIns and BnoIns
would change their irrigation investment decision and would not reinvest in irrigation
when crop insurance become available at minimal cost. In the long run, the fraction of
land irrigated at the county level will decrease because this fraction of the population
withdraw irrigation investment when enrolled in crop insurance.
The intuition behind this model is that farmers make irrigation investment deci-
sions based on the expected benefit of irrigation in the long-term because irrigation
is largely an fixed-cost investment with limited variable cost. The long-term benefit
of irrigation depends on the yield gaps between optimal yields can be achieved by
using irrigation and yield under natural precipitation conditions. Crop insurance rise
the effective yield received by farmers to the guaranteed yield in years when realized
yield falls below the yield guarantee, thus reduce the expected benefit of irrigation.
Irrigation investment is reduced with reduced expected benefit of irrigation.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The main empirical challenge of evaluating the impact of crop insurance on input
responses is the endogenous nature of these decisions. Ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates used by Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) to study chemical and fertilizer
use responses to insurance is likely to be biased. The simultaneous decision-making
process of crop insurance, the financial risk management tool, and irrigation, the pri-
mary drought risk mitigation field practice, is modeled in section 2.3. Multi-equation
structural models (Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012; Goodwin and Smith, 2003; Wu,
1999a) have been used to obtain unbiased estimates in the face of this endogeneity
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problem in cross-sectional analysis. Besides Annan and Schlenker (2015), time varia-
tion of crop insurance and input and output responses have been left unexplored. This
study takes advantage of a policy change as an instrument for the endogenous variable
crop insurance coverage, using instrumental variable (IV) approach on a county-level
panel (Wooldridge, 2010). In particular, this method estimates how much change in
irrigation behaviors is caused by the exogenous increase in crop insurance partici-
pation induced by the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (Title I od P.L.
103-354) assuming that the timing of the policy is random and that the policy had
no direct impact on irrigation.
2.4.1 Main Specification
The main identification strategy is to construct IV estimates using post 1994 dummy
as an instrument. For each corn producing county i (i = 1, ..., N) in the contiguous
United States in time t (t = 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007), the specification for
the panel IV regression is:
(5)
IRit = β0 + β1Ĉit + β2Xit + ρiti + γiDi + εit
with first-stage equation: (6)





IRit is the dependent variable, a measure of irrigation described in section 2.5.
Cit is a measure of crop insurance, the endogenous variable, described in section 2.5,
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and Ĉit is the fitted value from the first-stage equation. Post94t is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 for observations after 1994 and 0 otherwise. The validity of this
instrument is the key of this identification strategy and is presented in 2.4.2. β1 is
the estimates of interests which measures the response of irrigation to crop insurance.
Xit is a vector of exogenous weather controls described in section 2.5, including
precipitation, precipitation squared and temperature measured in degree-days. Tem-
peratures are controlled for because they are important determinants of crop irriga-
tion needs. The amount of water required for plants to grow, crop water requirement
(CWR), can be measured by evapotranspiration (ET), the sum of the water tran-
spired from the plant issues and evaporated from the surface of the surrounding soil.
ET is based on multiple factors with temperature and solar radiation as major factors
(Goyal and Harmsen, 2014). Irrigation water requirement is the fraction of CWR not
satisfied by natural precipitation. Therefore, factors such as temperature and solar
radiation impact irrigation needs through CWR. ti is a vector of normalized county-
specific time trends. They capture time-variant factors, such as changes in human
capital, technology and other economic and social factors. Di is a vector of county
fixed effects that capture time-invariant factors in each county, such as soil suitability,
solar radiation and other geographic characteristics that impact irrigation. County
fixed effects can also effectively control for adverse selection at the county level. εit
and ηit are error terms.
2.4.2 Validity of the Instrument
An IV estimate is an unbiased estimate of the causal effect between crop insurance,
the endogenous variable, and irrigation, the dependent variable, only if it satisfies (1)
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the instrument must have a clear effect on the endogenous variable, which is the first
stage, and (2) the only reason for the relationship between dependent variable and
instrument is through the endogenous variable, the exclusion restriction (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). The post 1994 dummy satisfies both conditions.
Relevance
The Post 1994 dummy is relevance since crop insurance enrollment increased dra-
matically after 1994. Figure 2.4.1 shows that number of acre insured and percentage
of planted acre insured increased sharply after 1994 and such increase is not driven by
any sharp changes in number of planted acre for corn and soybean. The red vertical
lines mark 1994 when the policy was enacted and the dash lines mark six census years
in which extensive margins of irrigation were observed in the constructed panel data.
The impact of FCIRA on crop insurance participation, the first stage, is presented in
Table 2.6.1.
The FCIRA of 1994 authorized a new catastrophic (CAT) coverage that pays
60% of the market price of the coverage when crop losses exceeding 50%, which is
an equivalent of 30% revenue coverage for the insured crop (50% yield * 60% market
price = 30% revenue). The premium of this coverage level is fully subsided by the
government and only required a $50 per crop per county of administrative fee. This
Act also made enrollment in crop insurance a mandatory prerequisite for receiving
deficiency payment under price support programs, certain loans, and other benefits.
The FCIRA boosted crop insurance enrollment drastically. Take-up rate measured
by percentage planted acre insured increased from 13.9% to 30.0% for corn and 10.5%
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to 30.0% for soybean from 1994 to 19951. This translate into an increase of 102% for
corn and 164% for soybean in net acre enrolled in crop insurance. The mandatory
requirement was repelled after one year, which explained the sharp drop of total
acres insured and percentage insured in 1996. However, enrollment post 1996 was
still significantly higher than prior to 1994 and has experienced steady growth since
then on.
Exclusion Restriction
The Post 1994 dummy also satisfies the exclusion restriction, which can be broken
down to two parts: (1) the instrument Post 1994 dummy has no effect on irrigation
other than through the first stage channel of crop insurance; and (2) the timing of
FCIRA is as good as randomly assigned(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). I examined four
major factors that may induce a sharp change in irrigation use before and after 1994
and found no significant evidence that any events other than droughts could have
induced a sharp change in irrigation besides the first stage channel. These factors
include:(1)policy, (2) input and output prices, (3) weather, and (4) irrigation and
related technology.
Policy
There was no agricultural policy that was enacted around the time when the FCIRA
was enacted that had a potential to induce a sharp change in irrigation. In partic-
ular, there was no major nationwide policy changes in water conservation or farm
loan programs that can result in significant alteration of irrigation behaviors. In the
1Author computed from RMA data.
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United States, the primary agricultural and food policy tool of the federal government
agricultural policy is the Farm Bill, a comprehensive omnibus bill, which is passed
every five years. The Farm Bill prior to 1994 was passed in 1990, the Food, Agri-
culture, Conservation and Trade Act, and then the Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform Act was passed in 1996.
In addition, the FCIRA is largely a top-down effort and the exact timing of FCIRA
is unlikely to be predicted by farmers, despite the significant presence in the general
agricultural legislation process of farmers’ organizations such as Farmers Bureau. The
FCIRA was part of the ongoing effort of moving away from the ad hoc disaster relief
and price supporting programs to a market-based and non-trade-distorting insurance
program under World Trade Organization requirement. It was put in place in 1994
after a series of bad years in the late 80s and early 90s that required large government
ad hoc assistance to strengthen the Federal Crop Insurance program which has failed
to achieve a level of participation that the government had hoped for after a large
program expansion in 19802. It is worth noting that crop insurance is not the only
safety net programs to which farmers have access. Farmers have been getting support
from government disaster assistance since the 1930s. The crop insurance program
has co-existed with other safety net programs, such as Deficiency Payments, since
its authorization. Farmers who are enrolled with CAT coverage have an equivalent
of 30% revenue coverage in addition to benefits from other farm price and income
support programs.
2History of the Crop Insurance Program: http://www.rma.usda.gov/aboutrma/what/history.html
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Commodity Prices
The volatility of commodity prices for major input and output within the window
of my study (1982-2007) were limited. If profitability of crop decreases sharply after
1994, farmers would have incentives to divest and withdraw irrigation besides being
discouraged to take precaution due to heavily subsidized crop insurance. Figure 2.4.2
shows that this is not the case here. Panel (a) shows prices for corn and soybean are
relatively stable throughout the 1980s to early 2000s compared to the huge price hike
in 2008. Panel (b) shows prices for fertilizers which demonstrates a similar trend with
a greater price hike in 2008.
Weather
Weather showed significant difference before and after 1994. In particular, two major
droughts and one extreme wet year in the Corn Belt during the period of this study
both occurred prior to 1994. Figure 2.4.3 presents county-average cumulative precip-
itation, moderate and extreme heat measured in degree-days from 1981 to 2012 (see
subsection 2.5 for the description of weather data). Cumulative precipitation was
exceptionally low during the 1983 drought and excess extreme heat were presented
during both 1983 and 1988 drought. The most recent drought in 2012 is presented
as reference which also shows very low cumulative precipitation and excess extreme
heat. I control for these weather variables to eliminate this channel through which
the Post 1994 dummy affects irrigation.
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Technology
Breakthroughs in agricultural technology regarding irrigation system and drought-
tolerant variety in corn and soybean production have been limited3. The Central pivot
systems has been the dominant irrigation management system in the corn belt since its
invention by Frank Zybach in the 1950s, and not much has changed besides marginal
improvement on nozzles and low pressure system, which are adapted for precision
agriculture and fertigation4. Improvement on crop varieties has not improved crop
drought-tolerance in terms of drought sensitivity. In contrast, corn yield sensitivity
to drought has increased overtime, while crop genetics are selected for high yields
(Lobell et al., 2014).
2.5 Data and Summary Statistics
Irrigation is understudied empirically due to the scarcity of data below state-level
on the national scale, which is also a limiting factor in this study. However, large
between- and within- county heterogeneity in the United States provides a good case
for an empirical study of irrigation, despite the omission of individual heterogeneity.
A county-level panel data for corn and soybean producing counties5 were constructed
by combining three public available datasets from the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA): (1) insurance coverage from the Risk Management Agency
3Based on author’s private correspondence with Betsy Bower, Agronomist and Irrigation Spe-
cialist at Ceres Solutions Inc., Indiana
4fertilization is the injection of fertilizers, soil amendments, and other water-soluble products into
an irrigation system.
5A county is included in the sample if the maximum acre harvested of 6 census years between
1982 and 2007 is greater than zero.
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(RMA)6 (2) irrigated7 and harvested acres for corn and soybean from six waves of
Census of Agriculture from 1982 to 20078 and (3) irrigated and planted acres for corn
and soybean from Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (ARMS)9.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of measure of crop insurance
and irrigation by year. The significant increase in crop insurance enrollment before
and after 1994 shown in Figure 2.4.1 is also evident in the descriptive statistics. There
is a sharp increase in the number of non-zero observations as well as in the average
magnitude of non-zero observations. Logarithm of acre irrigated presented an upward
trend over the study period with no significant break around 1994, which support the
validity of IV approach.
Measure of Crop Insurance
Crop insurance take-up is measured by fraction of the land insured, which is calculated
by dividing insured acres by acres of land allocated to individual crop production.
The RMA data summarize all actual contracts in a given year for a give county by
crop by contract types from 1981 to present annually. Net reported insured acres10
are aggregated across contract type and coverage level by crop to generate insured
acres for corn and soybean for each corn and soybean producing county in the Corn
6download from http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob/scc/index.html
7Irrigated acres are acres with irrigation installed and does not necessary reflect whether that
acre received actual irrigation.
8download from Inter-university Consortium for Political and SocialResearch at University of
Michigan https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp.
9download from USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Quick Stats/
10Number of acres reported is being planted adjusted by the insured’s share in the acreage. (e.g.
reported acres * insured’s share).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics - Corn in All Producing Counties
N = 16470, n=2745, T=6
Full Sample Non-zero Subsample
Year Mean Std. Dev. % Zero Mean Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. Median 90th Pctl.
% Insured
1982 5.563 9.638 36.36 8.740 10.87 0.656 4.748 22.35
1987 7.880 12.38 32.60 11.69 13.53 0.936 7.237 29.38
1992 13.42 17.46 28.23 18.70 18.06 1.723 13.46 46.25
1997 32.23 27.74 17.70 39.16 25.76 7.787 35.90 77.70
2002 41.68 32.78 15.74 49.47 29.83 9.615 47.39 94.34
2007 49.98 37.06 15.48 59.14 32.91 11.61 62.32 100
Total 25.13 30.35 24.35 33.21 30.81 2.16 22.46 85.17
log(Irrigated)
1982 2.168 3.625 71.73 7.670 2.064 5.252 7.622 10.39
1987 2.776 3.716 61.24 7.162 2.047 4.635 7.081 9.963
1992 2.727 3.800 63.64 7.500 1.973 5.231 7.356 10.17
1997 2.576 3.774 65.32 7.428 2.239 5.017 7.430 10.25
2002 2.859 3.868 62.11 7.545 2.027 5.218 7.528 10.26
2007 3.056 4.043 61.06 7.848 2.086 5.352 7.877 10.57
Total 2.694 3.816 64.18 7.521 2.083 5.069 7.491 10.27
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics - Soybean in All Producing Counties
N = 12342, n=2057, T=6
Full Sample Non-zero Subsample
Year Mean Std. Dev. % Zero Mean Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. Median 90th Pctl.
% Insured
1982 9.999 18.15 38.31 16.21 20.83 1.133 7.402 45.44
1987 8.635 13.06 28.00 11.99 14.02 1.018 7.007 29.39
1992 8.677 12.30 26.84 11.86 13.00 0.725 7.221 30.50
1997 30.40 27.24 15.80 36.11 25.98 5.387 31.63 76.04
2002 46.08 32.37 11.62 52.14 29.49 7.019 54.09 91.24
2007 42.45 29.87 12.54 48.53 26.91 26.91 51.09 82.01
Total 24.37 28.48 22.18 31.32 31.32 31.32 21.60 75.97
log(Irrigated)
1982 1.723 3.153 75.89 7.146 1.570 5.375 7.002 9.267
1987 1.857 3.206 73.41 6.981 1.689 5.037 6.760 9.330
1992 1.711 3.162 76.13 7.167 1.666 5.112 6.935 9.559
1997 1.990 3.399 73.12 7.401 1.710 5.429 7.155 9.983
2002 2.208 3.562 70.54 7.493 1.853 5.347 5.347 10.22
2007 2.139 3.485 70.73 7.310 1.922 5.193 6.981 10.19
Total 1.938 3.337 73.30 7.258 1.755 5.215 7.040 9.676
Notes: Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarize measure of crop insurance and measure
of irrigation by year. The left panels present descriptive statistics for the full sample
and the right panels present descriptive statistics for non-zero observations. For both
corn and soybean, percentage of land insured increased significantly from 1992 to
1997 both in number of non-zero observations and on the magnitude of non-zero
observations. Acres irrigated presented an upward trend with no significant breaks
for both corn and soybean.
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Belt11.
While planted acres of each crop is the ideal measure of land allocation in the
denominator, I use harvested acres as a proxy for land allocated to each crop due
to large measurement errors of planted acres and for the consistency of data source.
There are two sources of data for land allocation: (1) Census of Agriculture requires
all farm operators to report the number of acres harvested in the census year 12 and
aggregates individual population data to get county level acre harvested for each crop;
(2)ARMS uses an approximation from a representative subsample of all farms in the
June Agricultural Survey of each year to derive acres planted at county level (Annan
and Schlenker, 2015). By definition, planted acres cannot be smaller than harvested
acres, however, due to the difference in the data generating process, planted acres are
smaller than harvested acres in 33.36% sample for corn 13.
The percentage of land insured can be larger than 100 if the actual planting
area is underestimated using self-reported census data on harvested acres. In the
baseline specification, I use the maximum of the harvested acres in each county be-
tween 1982 and 2007 as the denominator and capped the percentage of insured acre
at 10014(Annan and Schlenker, 2015). Capping percentage of land insured at 100
affected 6.7% county-year observations for corn.
11A county is defined as corn/ soybean producing county if its maximum corn/soybean harvested
acres among six census years is greater than zero.
12Census of Agriculture is collected every five year and every farm operator is required to response
to the survey by law.
13Planted acres are smaller than harvested acres in 23.7% of sample for soybean and the difference
are very large. I have therefore limited my analysis to corn because of poor quality of soybean data.
14For robustness check, fraction of land insured is also generated (1) by using maximum planted
aces from ARMS between 1982 and 2007 and capping the percentage at 100, and (2) by allowing
the percentage measures to be greater than 100.
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Measure of Irrigation
Use of irrigation is measured by logarithm of harvested acre irrigated plus one. The
logarithm measure is used because the estimate of interest is the relative percentage
change in irrigation use as crop insurance take-up increases. One is added during the
logarithm transformation to keep observations that equals zeros in the sample15.
Irrigated acres are self-reported in the Census of Agriculture from 1982 to 2007.
Overall, acre irrigated presented an upward trend for both corn and soybean from 1982
to 2007. Figure 2.5.1 presents the geographic expansion of irrigation use from 1982 to
2007. Because having adequate water source is a prerequisite for installing irrigation
systems, the geographic pattern of irrigation in 1982 coincides with locations of major
unconfined aquifers and so are the expansion of irrigation from 1982 to 2007 for
corn. Irrigation in corn and soybean is particularly concentrated above unconstrained
aquifer such as Ogallala aquifer, Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer and Floridian
aquifer.
Weather Data
Weather data come from an updated version of Schlenker and Roberts (2009), which
are extended through 2007. The weather data includes (1) measure for moderate heat,
which is cumulative degree-days between 10 ◦C to 29 ◦C for corn and between 10 ◦C
and 30 ◦C for soybean from March to August, (2) measure for extreme heat, which
is cumulative degree-days above 29 ◦C for corn and 30 ◦C for soybean from March
to August, and (3) cumulative precipitation from March to August and its squared
15To address the concern that the results may be driven by the arbitrarily added 1 unit, robustness
check are conducted using acre and thousand of acres as units.
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term. Details of construction of degree-days can be found in Supporting Information
Appendix of Schlenker and Roberts (2009). Weather in the Corn Belt is visualized
in Figure 2.4.3.
2.6 Results and Discussions
Empirical results are presented in the following sections. Analysis of irrigation re-
sponse to crop insurance is restricted to counties in the Corn Belt in subsection 2.6.1,
and then expanded to greater geographic regions for robustness checks. Subsample
analysis is conducted to explore heterogeneous effects among corn producing counties
in subsection 2.6.3.
2.6.1 Irrigation Responses
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present IV estimates for corn and soybean in the Corn Belt
respectively. Each column estimates equations (4) and (5) with weighted or non-
weighted IV including a different vector of controls. First stage and second stage
results are reported with F statistics for the excluded instrument. All columns (1)
estimate without weights and all columns (2) estimate with average planted acre
as weight. Four weather control variables and county fixed effects are included in
all columns. Time trends are controls in general linear term in columns (a), at
state-level in columns (b) and at county-level in columns (c). Column (c2) is the
preferred specification with county-specific time trends that allow time trends to vary
by counties and with average planted acre weights that give more weights to counties
where corn or soybean production is more prominent.
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The first stage results verify the claim in section 2.4.2 that post 1994 dummy is
a strong instrument. F statistics for the excluded instrument presents little concern
of a weak instrument. Coefficients for post 94 dummy are statistically significant at
1% level across all models for both corn and soybeans.
The second stage results verify Prediction I in section 2.3 that increasing insur-
ance coverage led to decreasing irrigation as farmers substitute irrigation with crop
insurance to mitigate risk of crop failure in drought years. For corn production, the
irrigation response to the drastic increase in crop insurance take-up induced by the
FCIRA of 1994 is consistently negative 3-4% at 1% significance level across all mod-
els. The magnitudes of the estimates for the weighted model is greater than that of
non-weighted models. The magnitudes do not show significant variance depending
on controls of time trends. Table 2.3 column(c2) shows that in corn with irrigation
decrease as much as 4.42% when enrolled in crop insurance in the Corn Belt, regard-
less of the type of contracts or coverage levels. For soybean production, the irrigation
response to the policy induced insurance enrollment increase is consistently negative,
but of not statistically significant. These results suggest that corn production is sub-
ject to ex ante moral hazard demonstrated via the channel of withdrawing irrigation,
while soybean production is less susceptible. Section 2.6.4 offers explanations for
the differential responses between corn and soybean from the perspectives of plant





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Most fields in the Corn Belt grow corn and soybean in rotation. It is likely that
fields with irrigation system grow corn in one year and grow soybean in the following
years. I therefore test the robustness of the main results by applying IV approach for
corn and soybean combined16. Table 2.5 presents IV estimates for corn and soybean
combined. Setup of the table is similar to that of corn and soybean. The first stage
verifies that post 1994 dummy is a strong instrument for changes in acres insured for
corn and soybean combined. F statistics for the excluded instrument present little
concern of a weak instrument. Coefficients for post 1994 dummy are statistically
significant at 1% confidence level across all models. Second stage results confirms
that increasing insurance coverage led to decreasing irrigation. Irrigation decreased
2-3% in response to the drastic increase in crop insurance take-up induced by the
insurance subsides. The results agree with the results from analysis for corn only,
and are statistically significant at 1% confidence level.
Table 2.6 present IV results using the preferred specification. All columns include
weather controls, county-fixed effects, county-specific time trends, and are weighted
by average planted acres. The left panel presents results for corn and the right panel
present results for soybean with an increased sample sizes from columns(a) to (c).
Columns (a) is copied from columns (c2) of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 as reference.
Columns (b) includes all corn or soybean producing counties east of 100 meridian,
where agricultural is mainly rain-fed with some supplemental irrigation. Columns (c)
16Acres insured are calculated by taking the sum of acres with insurance for corn and for soybean;











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































include all corn or soybean producing counties in the United States. First and second
stage results are reported with F statistics for the excluded instrument. Non-weighted
IV results for expended geographic regions are presented in Table 2.7.
First stage results remains statistically significant at the 1% level across all mod-
els with little concerns of weak instruments. Irrigation responses to crop insurance
enrollment boost remain statistically significant negative at around 4% level for corn,
which indicate that ex ante moral hazard of withdrawing irrigation is universal across
the United States and is not only a regional phenomenon observed in the Corn Belt.
Irrigation response to crop insurance for soybean switched sign but have no statisti-
cal power, indicating that irrigation decisions regarding soybean production has little
dependence on crop insurance enrollment.
2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects in Corn
This section further explores the heterogeneous effects of crop insurance enrollment
on irrigation use in corn production varies across county subgroups using sub-sample
analysis. In particular, pairs of subgroups along three dimensions are examined: (1)
precipitation variance, (2) initial irrigation status and (3) production status. Detailed
division of subgroups and explanations of the results are provided in the following
section. Table 2.8 presents weighted IV regression results of sub-sample analysis.
Table 2.9 presents the summary of sub-sample analysis for corn producing counties
in the United States. The coefficients are taken from Table 2.8. All standard errors
are clustered at the state level and reported in parenthesis. Z-tests are used to test
the hypothesis that differences between coefficients from the pair of sub-samples are



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for each pair of sub-sample analysis.
High v.s. Low Precipitation Variance
Recall that farmers whose annual mortgage payments C for irrigation system are
between BIns and BnoIns are the ones that would withdraw irrigation when crop
insurance becomes available at minimal cost in the long-term. Additionally, BnoIns−
BIns = q(X − YL) is greater when q is greater. Therefore, for a given distribution of
C, the larger the difference, the more likely some farmers would withdraw irrigation
because of crop insurance. The decrease in irrigation would be greater in counties
with a higher probability of low rainfall events than in their counterparts. Intuitively,
producers are more likely to withdraw risk management effort if the probability of
insurance payout, which guarantees the fixed amount of production X, under the
natural precipitation condition is high.
This hypothesis is tested by dividing the full sample into two subsamples based
on the relative variances of annual cumulative precipitation from 1981 to 2013. If a
county has a relative variance above the population median relative variance, it is
grouped into the high variance subsamples; otherwise, the county is grouped into the
low variance subsample. Figure 2.6.1 panel (a) presents a histogram of cumulative
precipitation from March to August by relative variance, counting each county-year as
one observation. The red vertical line represents the lower 10th percentile of county-
year precipitation and the orange vertical line represents the lower 25th percentile.
Precipitation distribution function of counties with high relative variance has more
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This suggest that counties with above median relative variance are more like to expe-
rience inadequate water under natural conditions. Two-sample KolmogorovSmirnov
test 17 confirms that distribution functions for high and low relative variance subsam-
ple are statistically significantly different with p-value of 0.000 and that precipitation
values in the low relative variance subsample are smaller than these in the high rel-
ative variance subsample with the largest difference of 0.2681 and p-value for this
difference of 0.000. Spatial distribution of the two groups are presented in Figure
2.6.1 panel (b).
Table 2.8 column (b1) and (b2) report IV regression results for high relative vari-
ance sub-sample and low relative variance sub-sample respectively. Irrigation de-
creased by 3.90% with crop insurance enrollment on average for the high variance
group and decreased by 4.35% for the low variance group. However, the difference
between these two groups are not statistically significant as shown in Table 2.9. The
sub-sample analysis is limited due to lack of information on other crucial irrigation de-
terminants such as soil texture 18 and irrigation water availability. Empirical results
cannot verify the hypothesis that counties are more likely to reduce irrigation use
when enrolled in crop insurance if the probability of insurance payout under natural
precipitation is high.
Irrigation Necessity and Suitability
Farmers who would invest in irrigation without insurance is with annual cost of irriga-
tion C that is less than or equals to the benefit BnoIns = Y −pYH−qYL−(1−p−q)YM .
17Use STATA command ksmirnov.
18Sandy soils have lower water holding capacity and are more prone to drought, while clay soils
are less permeable and are more prone to floods.
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Irrigation status of 1978 was used as a proxy for irrigation necessity and suitability,
assuming that crop insurance enrollment was sufficiently low and had little influence
on irrigation choice19.
If a county reported irrigation as early as 1978 when there was only 4.38% of
corn field irrigated, two conditions are likely to occur. First, in counties where water
availability is limited and cost of obtaining irrigation is high, irrigation is likely to be
an indispensable part of corn production, in other words, a high return to irrigation.
In this case, the difference between Y and YH , YM and YL are large. Second, in
counties where natural precipitation is able to support some level of corn production,
in other words, benefit of irrigation is small, irrigation is likely to be accessible at a
very low cost to farmers. In this case, C is low because of favorable topography and
proximity to water source. Figure ?? shows spatial distribution of initial irrigation
status and major aquifer. Most counties with irrigation in 1978 are located where
major aquifers are. Thus, counties that reported irrigation use in 1978 were defined
as counties with high irrigation necessity and suitability and counties that did not
report irrigation use in 1978 as counties with low irrigation necessity and suitability.
This endogenous analysis is limited as the information on water availability and
other agronomic determinants on irrigation necessity and suitability were not included
in this study. It is likely that irrigation choice is path dependent due to demanding
initial investment, in other words, county with irrigation in this period is more likely
to use irrigation in the following period. However, this path dependence would die
down after a certain period given the limited life time of irrigation equipments.
Table 2.8 column (c1) and (c2) report IV regression results for initially irrigated
19While FCIP was created in 1930s,USDA RMA only has records from 1981.
49
and initially not irrigated counties respectively. There are 21.7 percent corn producing
counties with irrigation in 1978. The coefficient for the fraction of land insured
for these counties is -0.0246, indicating a 2.46% decrease in irrigation due to crop
insurance coverage on average. This is statistically smaller than the coefficients for
the initially not irrigated counties are -0.0573, which indicating a 5.73% decrease in
irrigation use. Z-statistics for the comparison are reported in Table 2.9.
In sum, counties with low irrigation necessity and suitability are more likely to
shirk when provided with crop insurance. This provides empirical evidence that the
ex ante moral hazard is less severe, when the cost of precaution is low or the benefit
of precaution is high.
Major v.s. Minor Production Regions
Table 2.8 column (d1) and (d2) report IV regression results for major and minor corn
producing counties. All counties are sorted by size of production in descending order
and calculate cumulative production. Counties that contribute to 95% of cumulative
production is referred as major production county of a given year and the rest are
referred as minor production counties. Around two third of the sample are classified
as major producing counties and one third minor producing counties.
Irrigation response to crop insurance enrollment is statistically insignificant in
minor producing counties. The magnitude of response in major producing counties,
which is -0.0417, are very close to the average response from the full sample of -0.0413.
The difference in coefficients in this pair of sub-samples are statistically significant.
The negative response of irrigation to crop insurance enrollment the full sample is
driven by the responses in major producing counties.
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Table 2.9: Summary of Sub-sample Analysis: Corn (weighted)
Sub-sample Coeff. Robust s.e. p-value z- stat
High Variance -0.0390*** (0.0142)
Low Variance -0.0435*** (0.0107) 0.4013 0.2531
Initially Irrigated -0.0264*** (0.0101)
Initially Not Irrigated -0.0573*** (0.00885) 0.0107 2.301**
Major Production -0.0417*** (0.0102)
Minor Production -0.0108 (0.0144) 0.0401 -1.751**
Notes: Table 2.9 presents the summary of sub-sample analysis for corn producing
counties in the United States. The coefficients are estimated using the preferred
specification, including four weather controls, county fixed effects, county-specific time
trends and weighted by average planted acres. The dependent variable is logarithm
of acre irrigated and the independent variable is percentage of land insured capped
at 100 percent. The standard errors are clustered at the state-level and reported
in parantheses. P-values and z-statistics are reported for each pair of sub-sample
analysis. Significance levels are indicated by *** 1%, ** 5% , * 10%.
51
2.6.4 Discussions
The empirical evidence shows a significant reduction of greater than 4% in acres
irrigated in corn production in response to crop insurance enrollment, and shows
not significant changes in irrigation use in soybean production. Such difference in
responses between corn and soybean can be attributed to the difference in plant
physiology and agricultural economic factors.
First and foremost, production risk for corn is significantly greater than soybean
due the difference in their plant physiology. Figure 2.3.1 reflects the higher sensitivity
to moisture stress in corn with a more concave production curve. Corn is very sus-
ceptible to drought stress due to the plant requirement for water for cell elongation
and its inability to delay vegetative growth. To obtain high yields for corn, the envi-
ronmental conditions have to be favorable at all growth stage. As the corn matures
through tasseling to silking, moisture status becomes critical. Drought or heat stress
during the silking stage can kill pollens before its reaches the silks and result in 100%
yield loss. Irrigation as a precaution in corn production is the primary risk manage-
ment measure in the absence of crop insurance, thus it is also more susceptible to ex
ante moral hazard when enrolled in crop insurance.(Heiniger, 2001)
In contracts, soybean is much more flexible than corn in adapting to period of
moisture stress and response to drought stress over a much longer period of time and
range of growth stages. Soybean has several mechanisms throughout their growth
stages to compensate for yield losses. It is able to continue its vegetative growth
when the reproductive stage starts to compensate for moisture stress in early stage of
vegetative growth. It is also able to compensate for loss in total pods per plant due
to stress in early stages of reproductive growth with larger seed size should moisture
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become available later. Benefits of irrigation in mitigating environmental stress in
soybean production are limited in the face of these build-in mechanisms. Irrigation is
much less likely to be withdraw as crop insurance became available. (Rosenger et al.,
2012)
Furthermore, insurance could help farmers to meet collateral requirements when
obtaining loans to purchase irrigation systems that requires a large upfront cost, thus
would have a more significant effect in promoting use of irrigation among credit con-
strained farmers20. Farm credit and irrigation equipment sales data were not collected
for this study, thus income effects on irrigation in corn and soybean production can
not be tested directly. Figure 2.6.3 demonstrates various trends in the scale of corn
and soybean production in the Corn Belt and in United States. There is a decline
in planted acres of soybean in the 1980s and a slow recovery throughout the 1990s,
while planted acres of corn was volatile in the 1980s and sustained production scales
at around 80 million acres throughout the 1990s and early part of 2000s. During the
study period, percentage of corn planted acres in the Corn Belt remained at around
92%, while the percentage of soybean planted acres in the Corn Belt experienced a
steady increase from 1982 to 2002 from 84% to 92% then slight decrease thereafter.
While not proving the case of credit constraint directly, there trends demonstrated
the possibility that soybean production faced more credit constraints than corn pro-
duction in the study period which coincides with the farm debt crisis in 1980s to
20For example, farm credit, a nationwide network of borrower-owned lending institution that
provides agricultural loans across the U.S. applies a 40% discount rate on crop collateral without
out crop insurance. A farmer with no additional collateral but crop will only be able to take out loan
equal to 60% of estimated crop revenue based on past yield history. If he purchase a revenue based
crop insurance with coverage above 60%, it will increase maximum loan account to the coverage





This study examines the presence of ex ante moral hazard in the FCIP in the United
States. The findings of this study provide empirical evidence of significant ex ante
moral hazard in corn production under the federal crop insurance scheme. In particu-
lar, crop insurance enrollment, which is induced by the massive expansion of Federal
Crop Insurance Program in 1994, lead to 4.17% decrease in acres irrigated in corn
production on average, pooling insurance contracts across types and coverage lev-
els. Heterogeneous effects reveals that this result are driven by responses in major
producing counties and that heterogeneity in precipitation pattern does not result in
heterogeneous irrigation response to crop insurance. Further, irrigation use in coun-
ties with great necessity and suitability, responded less negatively to crop insurance
enrollment than their counterparts. This indicates that ex ante moral hazard is less
severe, when the cost of precaution is low or the benefit of precaution is high. Ir-
rigation use in soybean production behaves very differently compared to corn. In
particular, irrigation use did not change with statistical significance in response to
crop insurance enrollment.
The findings of this paper are important contributions to the literature on ex
ante moral hazard. They provide direct evidence that insurance deters precaution
in the context of crop insurance market. Both the comparison between corn and
soybean and the heterogeneous analysis reveal that the reduction of precaution is less
severe when the cost of precaution is low or the benefit of precaution in the absence of
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insurance is high. This paper also contribute to the literature on the U.S. agricultural
policy. It highlights another knock-on effect of promoting crop insurance using federal
premium subsidies from the perspective of irrigation.
These results have important policy implications in this transitional time when
the federal government is cutting premium subsidies for the crop insurance program.
Federal Crop Insurance Program is currently the second largest budget item in the
Farm Bill of 2014 with 89.8 billion budget allocation. The federal government pays
about 60 percent of total premium on average currently, and the undergoing budget
cut will reduce the subsidy rate to around 40 percent by 2023 with an aim to save 27
billion over 2014 to 2023 (Congressional Budget Office, 2013). Empirical evidence of
the substantive relationship between irrigation use and crop insurance can alleviate
some concerns of increasing overall production risk due to less federal support in crop
insurance. The findings of this study implies that reducing government support for
crop insurance may have less impact on farm business risk than expected and reduced
crop insurance subsidies have the potential to partially restore farmers’ incentives to




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.4.1: Insurance Response to FCIRA of 1994
(a) Corn (b) Soybean
Notes: Figures 2.4.1 show that insurance take-up increased sharply after 1994 for
both corn and soybean and that such increase is not driven by any sharp changes in
planted acres. Further, planted acres for corn does not present strong time trend in the
period of this study, while planted acres for soybean present some time trend. Panel
(a) presents line graph of fraction of planted acres insured measured in percentage
of contemporary planted acre insured, total planted acres and total insured acres
measured in millions of acres for corn at the national level from 1981 to 2012. Panel
(b) presents the same graph for soybean. The red vertical lines mark 1994 when
the policy was enacted and the dash lines mark six census years in which extensive

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.6.2: Spatial Distribution of Initial Irrigation Status and Major Aquifer
Figure 2.6.3: Scale of Production for Corn and Soybean 1982-2007
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Chapter 3





Agriculture is the largest source of nonpoint source (NPS) pollution in the United
States (EPA, 2009). Nutrient runoff from agriculture contributes to major water
quality problems, such as entrophication of the “Dead Zone” in the Gulf of Mexico and
nitrate contamination in drinking water. While NPS has been a major public concern
since the Green Revolution, policy instruments that directly regulate NPS pollution
from agriculture is very limited due to the complexity of identifying and monitoring.
In the United States, regulation targeting NPS mostly takes forms of education and
technical assistance programs. These programs heavily rely on voluntary participation
and can not make up for the absence of a credible regulation threat.
In the search for effective agricultural NPS regulation measures, economic in-
centive programs were brought to light as they are believed to be cost-effective in
mitigating negative environmental externalities. While various forms of economic in-
centive programs are studied theoretically, the actually implementation of economic
incentive program in agricultural NPS control is very limited, with fertilizer tax im-
plemented in parts of United States and much of Europe to fund pollution controls
being the only case (Larson et al., 1996). As a result, empirical evidence of the ef-
fects of economic incentive programs in regulating agricultural NPS is absent in the
literature.
This study examines a strong alternation in economic incentives induced by heav-
ily subsidized crop insurance authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act
(FCIRA) of 1994. Although FCIRA does not target agricultural NPS, it provides
a strong economic incentive in altering production behaviors via risk management.
To begin with, this paper presents a theoretical framework of fertilizer response to
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the provision of yield-based insurance. It assumes that farmers are profit maximizers
and choose optimal levels of fertilizer application to maximize long-term expected
profits given weather uncertainty. The model predicts that optimal level of fertilizer
application is lower and excess fertilizer is reduced when crop insurance is available.
Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence that fertilizer application is
reduced in the Corn Belt as a response to changes in crop insurance enrollment in-
duced by policy changes. Identifying the casual effect of crop insurance on input use is
challenging because the endogeneity of these decisions. Previous studies used the si-
multaneous equation approach to address the issue in cross-sectional data. This study
improves the empirical strategy by applying fixed-effect instrumental variable (IV) ap-
proach on a county-level annual panel dataset and taking advantage of policy changes
that exogenously altered crop insurance enrollment decisions. The county-level panel
is constructed by combining commercial nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) farm-use
fertilizer data from National Water-Quality Assessment Program (NWQAP), crop
insurance enrollment data from Risk Management Agent (RMA), and land use data
from the Census of Agriculture. Because nutritional requirements differ greatly across
crops, to make county-level fertilizer use data comparable only counties in the Corn
Belt with more than 75% cropland in corn and soybean production are included the
sample.
In the first stage, crop insurance enrollment is instrumented by dummy variables
for policy status and interacting terms of past extreme weather and a dummy vari-
able for the first year measuring initial response to heavy premium subsides. Both
the policy changes and past weather shocks are exogenous. The FCIRA of 1994 au-
thorized a fully subsidized catastrophic coverage and made enrollment mandatory.
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The mandatory requirement was dropped after one year. It is expected that crop
insurance enrollment would increase dramatically with premium subsidies and the
mandatory requirement, and would drop but not back to the pre-policy level when
the mandatory requirement was dropped. Further, counties experienced extreme
weather immediately prior to premium subsides provision are likely to react more
strongly as uncertainty bias is likely to be corrected when possibility of losses are
immediately presented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). First stage results confirm
these predictions with statistical significance.
Second stage results show that economic incentives from FCIRA significantly
changed farmers’ fertilizer application behaviors in the Corn Belt where corn and
soybean are dominant. Logarithm of and level of total commercial farm-use N and P
application are used as dependent variables. Total N fertilizer application decreased
18.5% when enrolled in crop insurance. The intensity of N application decreased 5.8
kilograms per acre with crop insurance, which is a 17.1% decrease compared to the
sample average of 33.9 kilograms per acre. Meanwhile, P use exhibits no significant
changes. These results are robust with varying time trends and length of the study
periods.
This difference between N and P fertilizer application responses to the change of
economic incentives introduced by the Federal Crop Insurance Program is expected.
The explanations are rooted in the natural processes of N and P in the soil and the
history of nutrients management in the US agriculture. On one hand, P fixation
capacity of soils combined with decades of overcompensating P application in the
Corn Belt results in limited yield responses to contemporaneous application of P, thus
little change in P application in response to economics incentives. On the other hand,
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equilibrium N content in soils for each given climate and farming system combined
with water solubility of commercial N fertilizer results in effective yield response to
contemporaneous application N fertilizer, thus significant change in N application in
response to economic incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background
on policy context of agricultural NPS pollution regulation and review of previous
studies. Section 3.3 details a theoretical framework with a prediction that fertilizer
use and excess fertilizer would decrease with crop insurance. Section 3.4 and section
3.5 describe the dataset and outline the empirical strategy. Section 3.6 presents the
empirical results and discussion. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation
Nonpoint source pollution (NPS) accounts for half of all water pollution in the United
States, and agriculture runoff is the single largest source of water pollution (EPA,
2009). Excessive runoff of sediments, nutrients and pesticides from agriculture im-
poses great environmental challenges and human health concerns. Excess N and P
fertilizers can leach through soil profile and emerge into surface water, contributing to
eutrophication (Correll, 1998; Hessen et al., 1997). The Gulf of Mexico “Dead Zone”
is a serious case of eutrophication caused by nutrients runoff. Runoff such as N and P
were dumped into the Gulf of Mexico by the Mississippi River with drainage area for
41% of the continental United States (Sherman and Capelli, 2012; NOAA, 2009). It
created an area of low to no oxygen that can kill fish and marine life with a maximum
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size of 8,400 square miles recorded in summer 2002. Nitrates that leaches through
soils and reaches drinking water has been associated with serious health concerns,
such as cancers of the digestive tract and infant methaemoglbinaemia, also known as
blue baby syndrome (Knobeloch et al., 2000; Powlson et al., 2008).
Water pollution caused by agriculture runoff has been a long standing concern of
policymakers. However, policy measures addressing the problem have been limited.
The nature of “nonpoint-ness” of NPS pollution makes identification, monitoring,
thus policy regulations more complex. Clean Water Act (CWA), the main federal act
to protect US water quality, primarily focuses on point source pollutions. Section 208
of 1972 CWA required states to identify NPS water pollution, but was regarded as
a failure in actually regulating it. Section 319 was added to 1982 CWA and directs
the states to draft and implement Best Management Practice (BMP) to reduce NPS.
The section was voluntary and gives federal government a limited role (Szalay, 2010).
Agricultural NPS reduction programs has taken various forms at the state level,
such as Command and Control (CAC) and voluntary programs. The majority of
the state plans rely on voluntary programs such as education and technical assistance
(Feather, 1995). These programs heavily rely on voluntary participation and can best
be used as a complement to a credible regulation threat (Lyon and Maxwell, 1999;
Dowd et al., 2008). While CAC programs have been successful in controlling point
source pollution, the requirement of tracking discharges to a specific parcel of land
or land management practice in applying CAC programs to NPS abatement makes it
very hard to implement (Dowd et al., 2008). Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs)
are the only tool in CWS that directly regulate NPS effluent at the federal level. But
there has been no empirical work systematically evaluating these programs to the
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best of my knowledge.
Economic incentives are gaining attraction in NPS regulation because of the belief
that market tools are cost-effective ways to mitigate negative externalities. Litera-
ture on regulating agricultural NPS using economic incentives are mainly model-
driven(Dowd et al., 2008). Dowd et al. (2008) reviewed economic incentive programs
including input tax, ambient tax and subsidies, governmental financial assistance,
tradable permits, liability rules and performance bonds. Dowd et al. (2008) agreed
with the literature that a policy cocktail should be used to address agricultural NPS,
for example, using CAC to set a mandatory minimum standard, using voluntary and
market incentives to achieve further reduction, and targeting major dischargers. Few
economic incentives programs that targets NPS reduction have been implemented,
such as using subsidies to increase incentive to adopt cover crop and to use manure
analysis and transport programs. Input tax is used in part of the United States and
much of Europe, with the primary purpose of financing pollution control instead of
to reduce input use (Larson et al., 1996).
This study examines fertilizer application changes in response to a drastic increase
in crop insurance take-up induced by Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA) of
1994. It aims to provide empirical evidence that farmers significantly change nutrient
management practice in response to economic incentives. Although FICRA was not
designed to mitigate NPS pollution, very high premium subsidies authorized by the
act offer a strong economic incentive and its impact on nutrient management can be
significant.
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3.2.2 Fertilizer Application and Crop Insurance
The impact of crop insurance on fertilizer and chemical use has been of great interests
in the agricultural economic literature since the dawn of upscaling of Federal Crop
Insurance Program (FCIP) via Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. This
causal relationship has been investigated both theoretically and empirically. Ra-
maswami (1993) and Babcock and Hennessy (1996) modeled input response to crop
insurance and concluded that input response to crop insurance depends on the risk
nature of the input. For risk-reducing inputs, input use is predicted to decrease when
a risk-averse farmer is enrolled in crop insurance, and for risk-increasing inputs, the
response can not be predicted analytically. Unlike irrigation or pesticides, the risk
nature of fertilizer is unclear. Although Babcock and Hennessy (1996) showed via
simulations that fertilizer use should decrease in response to crop insurance, and Just
et al. (1999) showed that crop insurance enrollment in FCIP is not driven by risk-
aversion incentives. Input response of fertilizer to crop insurance reminds inconclusive
empirically.
Table 3.1 summarizes empirical studies on impact of crop insurance on agricul-
tural chemical use, providing information on crop and study region, data source and
structure, identification strategy and findings. The results of these studies are mixed.
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), Wu (1999b) and Chang and Mishra (2012) found
statistically significant increase in fertilizer application or expenditure in farms with
crop insurance, while Smith and Goodwin (1996) and Mishra et al. (2005) found
statistically significant decrease in fertilizer or chemical expenditure. Because crop
insurance and fertilizer use are elements of the same decision-making process, there



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































showed that fertilizer use and crop insurance decisions are endogenous by using Wu-
Hauseman test. All these studies use farm-level cross-cross sectional data, and address
the endogenous issue with simultaneous equations. While many farm characteristics
were controlled for in these studies, it is a consensus in the econometrics literature
that the endogeneity problem can only be adequately addressed by exploiting an
exogenous variation that only shifts the endogenous variable.
This study takes advantage of county-level panel data on nitrogen (N) and phos-
phorus (P) fertilizer use in the US from 1987 to 2006 released by United States
Geological Survey (USGS) and exploits a nation-wide policy change in 1994, the Fed-
eral Crop Insurance Reform Act, that drastically increased crop insurance enrollment
from 1994 to 1995. Instrumental variable (IV) approach is a significant improvement
to the simultaneous equations approach. This study provides strong empirical ev-




To demonstrate how economic incentives offered by crop insurance may change fertil-
izer application choice, a simple model of yield insurance is presented, with a Cobb-
Douglas yield function and rainfall following a discrete probability function. The
model assumes that the only uncertainty in production comes from rainfall uncer-
tainty.
Suppose a farmer purchases a yield insurance with insured yield X that cost g(X),
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where g(X) is monotonic increasing with X and g(X) = 0 when X = 0. There are
two possible outcomes in respect of indemnity payment. If the realized yield y is less
than the coverage X, insurance pays for the difference X − y. In this state of the
world, the farmer receives revenue V1 = X, where the output price is normalized to
one. If the realized yield y is greater or equal to the coverage X, insurance does not
payout and the farmer receives revenue R2 = Y (N, r).His actual revenue V will be
V (r) =
 X if y < Xy if y ≥ X (3.1)
where y is the realized yield that follows y = Y (.) and output price is normalized
to 1. If realized yield y is less than the insured yield X, the insurance pays for the
difference; and if the realized yield y is greater than the insured yield X, insurance
does not pay.
The yield function y = Y (N, r) takes two inputs, with N representing fertilizer
application that costs P per unit and r representing water supply. Here y = Y (N, r)
is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
y = Y (N, r) = ANαrβ (3.2)
where A > 0, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 under the condition where nutrients and
water supply are in a practical range (N ∈ [0, N ]) and r ∈ [R,R]). Cobb-Douglas
production function has nice properties that reflect the relationships between crop
growth and nutrients and water supply:
1. Both nutrients and water are crucial for crop growth. Y (N, r) equals zero when
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either is absent.
2. Crop yield increases with the increase of water supply and with the increase of
nutrients. ∂Y (N,r)
∂N
> 0 and ∂Y (N,r)
∂r
> 0.







4. When nutrients are abundant, water supply acts as the limiting factor to growth,
and vise versa. ∂Y (N,r)
∂N
= Aαrβ×Nα−1 is limited by r when r takes a low value,
and ∂Y (N,r)
∂r
= AαNα × rβ−1 is limited by N when N takes a low value.
Most crop production in the Corn Belt is rain-fed, thus r can be conceptualized
as natural precipitation. r is stochastic and follows a discrete probability density
function f(r), where f(r) is
f(r) =

RH with probability p
RL with probability q
RM with probability 1− p− q
(3.3)
with 0 < p < 1, 0 < p < 1,0 < p + q < 1, and 0 < R ≤ RL < RM < RH ≤ R.
There are three possible states of the world. With probability p, weather will be
very favorable with abundant rainfall RH ; with probability q, there will be a drought
with very limited rainfall RL; with probability 1− p− q, weather will be normal with
around average rainfall RM .
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3.3.2 Farmer’s Optimization Problems
A representative farmer maximizes expected profits by choosing optimal fertilizer
level N . Three exercises are carried out: 1) optimal fertilizer level without insurance;
2) optimal fertilizer level with insured yield level X; 3) optimal fertilizer level in each
state of the world if the state of the world is known.




EnoIns(π) = p∗Y (N,RH)+(1−p−q)∗Y (N,RM)+q∗Y (N,RL)−P ∗N (3.4)
With insurance, the farmer has guaranteed yield of X in the worse state of the




EIns(π) = p∗X+ (1−p− q)∗Y (N,RM) + q ∗Y (N,RL)−P ∗N − g(X) (3.5)




π = p ∗ Y (N, r)− P ∗N (3.6)
Plug equation (3.2) into equation (3.4) to (3.6) respectively, and take the first order




equation (3.5), and N∗S (S ∈ [H,M,L]) for equation (3.6).
N∗noIns = Φ(pR
β

























L if RL is realized (3.11)








(A) N∗noIns > N
∗
Ins:
Profit maximizing farmers will use less fertilizer when insured.
(B) N∗noIns −N∗M > 0 and N∗noIns −N∗L > 0:
Farmers apply more fertilizer than optimal, when RH or RM are realized with
probability (1− p).
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Figure 3.3.1: Optimal Fertilizer Level
Notes: Optimal level of N when RH , RM and RL are realized are shown in Figure 3.3.1
with different shades of blues. Optimal fertilizer level N∗H , N
∗
M , and N
∗
L are found
where the slopes of a tangent lines are P , unit price of fertilizer, and are marked
with hollow blue dots. The black vertical dashed lines shows long-term optimal N∗Ins
with individual insurance, and green vertical dashed lines shows long-term optimal
N∗ = N∗noIns = N
∗
GrpIns without insurance and with group insurance.
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(C) (N∗noIns −N∗M) > (N∗Ins −N∗M) and (N∗noIns −N∗L) > (N∗Ins −N∗L):
Excess fertilizer is reduced when insured.
Agribusiness, specially for low-value crop growers, is a low profit margin industry,
and is highly susceptible to weather risks. To maximize profit, farmers have to make
sure that they take advantage of the few years when the weather is favorable (Sheriff,
2005). The more favorable the weather, the more fertilizer is need to support plant
growth. “Insurance application” of N for corn is a practice of knowingly applying
more fertilizer than needed in an average year in case the weather turned out to be
exceptionally favorable. This over-apply of fertilizer has been documented by Yadav
et al. (1997), whose results showed that farmers applies more nitrogen fertilizer than
could be utilized by corn plants in three sample sites in Minnesota. In addition,
Babcock (1992) showed in theory how uncertainty in production justifies “insurance
application”. Sheriff (2005) discussed qualitatively incentives that will prompt farms
to over-apply fertilizer, including the channel of production uncertainty.
Intuitively, farmers have less incentive when insured to apply more fertilizer than
needed on average years every year so that they can use high yields in good years to
make up for the losses in the bad years. Because these losses are partially mitigated
by insurance and the cost of “insurance application” is bore by the farmers.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Summary
The empirical part of this study combines three datasets and each dataset is described
in the following section. Descriptive summaries of key measures are also presented in
Table 3.2.
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Measure of Fertilizer Application
Measure of fertilizer application is available annually at county-level from National
Water-Quality Assessment Program (NWQAP). County-level N and P fertilizer for
farm use were estimated for the conterminous United States by NWQAP for 1987
to 2006 from the Association of American Plant Food Control Officials (AAPFCO)
fertilizer sales data and Census of Agriculture fertilizer expenditures1. Gronberg and
Spahr (2012) provide a detailed account of the estimation method.
To summarize, AAPFCO reports fertilizer sales data by fertilizer products by state
annually, with information on Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium(N-P-K) composition
of each product and farm and non-farm sale category for some states. Nitrogen and
P fertilizer for farm use were estimated by the summation of tonnage sold times the
percentage of N and P in each product and times the proportion sold for farm use.
State-level N and P commercial fertilizer farm use data were then disaggregated to
the county-level based on proportion of fertilizer expenditure of a county in the state.
County-level fertilizer expenditure data are reported in Census of Agriculture every
five years from 1987 to 2002, and linearly interpolated to fill the gaps between census
years.
Commercial fertilizer sales are a good proxy for total N and P application in the
Corn Belt. While N and P can come from manure, manure sources is limited in
the Corn Belt as animal production are limited, leaving commercial fertilizer most
1N and P fertilizer for non-farm use are estimated along with fertilizer use for farm use, which of-
fered a potential to apply difference-in-difference method in evaluating the impact of sudden increase
in crop insurance enrollment induced by the 1994 policy. Non-farm use fertilizer can be treated as
the control group, which is not impacted by crop insurance policy. However, non-farm use and farm
use fertilizer presents significantly different trends before and after the policy change, which makes
difference-in-difference an unsuitable method for this study.
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Figure 3.4.1: Spatial Distribution of Average N and P Fertilizer Use (1987-2006)
likely the exclusive source of N and P. Commercial fertilizers are sold and delivered to
farmers by request. The high cost of fertilizer storage and the convenience of in-time
delivery offered little incentive for farmers to purchase fertilizer in one year and use
it in a later year.
Figure 3.4.1 presents the spatial distribution of average N and P fertilizer use in
the Corn Belt. Figure 3.5.1 (a) presents the average N and P fertilizer use in counties
with crop concentration (defined in section 3.4) greater than 75% in the Corn Belt
from 1987 to 2006. There is no significant trends presented.
Measure of Crop Concentration
Nutritional requirements differ greatly across crops, thus counties with significantly
different crop compositions are hardly comparable in their fertilizer use. To keep
crop composition relatively consistent across selected sample, only counties with large
proportion of cropland dedicated to corn and soybean are selected. Because corn and
soybean production are very concentrated in the Corn Belt and are commonly used
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in a crop rotation system, a high percentage of total cropland dedicated to their
production is a good proxy for crop concentration measure at the county-level in the
Corn Belt.
Crop concentration is defined as percentage of cropland used in corn and soybean
production. Cropland allocation to corn and soybean are taken from the Census of
Agriculture from 1987 to 2002. Maximum total cropland among the census years are
used as denominator. Crop concentration in the Corn Belt did not alter significantly
during the study period. All land use is measured by percentage of maximum total
cropland. Production of corn experienced little change, while soybean production
experienced some expansion during the study period. Overall, crop concentration
is stable. Average crop concentration is calculated and used to select counties into
samples. Aguilar et al. (2015) Figure 3 showed that crop diversity in the Corn Belt
has been low historically, with only 3 to 4 effective species.
Measure of Crop Insurance Enrollment
Insurance data are collected from Risk Management Agency (RMA) United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The RMA data summarizes all actual crop in-
surance contracts by policy type, crop, county and year from 1981 to present with
coverage information from 1989 onwards. Since fertilizer data is only available at
the county-year level, the insurance data are aggregated to the county-year level. In
particular, crop insurance enrollment is measured by percentage of cropland with in-
surance. Acres of cropland insured are approximated by combining net reported acres
for corn and soybean across policy types and coverage for counties in the Corn Belt
with crop concentration greater than 75%. Acres insured is then divided by average
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cropland between 1982 to 2007 from the Census of Agriculture to generate percentage
of cropland with insurance.
Weather Controls
Annual weather data at county-level come from an updated version of Schlenker
and Roberts (2009), which are extended through 2006. Weather data include (1)
measure of precipitation during cropping season, which is cumulative precipitation
between March and August and its squared term, (2) measure for moderate heat
for crop growth, which is cumulative degree-days between 10 degree Celsius and 30
degree Celsius between March and August, and (3) measure of extreme heat, which
is cumulative degree-days above 30 degree Celsius between March and August.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The following section presents empirical study of the responses of fertilizer application
to the dramatic boost of crop insurance enrollment induced by the fully subsidies
“catastrophic”(CAT) level coverage authorized by FCIRA of 1994 using fixed-effect
two-stage least-square (FE-TSLS) model. For each counties i in year t, the FE-TSLS
model is specified as
Ferti,t = β0 + β1Insi,t + β3Wi,t + gi(t) + γiDi + εi,t (3.12)
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Key Measures
Variable (unit) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
N overall 8207.40 3906.21 182.48 30019.36
(thousand kg) between 3748.99 499.06 23757.43
within 1114.89 -2750.19 17564.81
P overall 1361.83 623.62 25.23 5228.26
(thousand kg) between 586.45 86.67 4024.95
within 214.34 -108.31 3277.17
Insurance Enrollment overall 0.471 0.262 0.003 1.084
between 0.147 0.137 0.846
within 0.217 -0.117 1.178
Precipitation overall 0.580 0.134 0.217 1.197
(meter) between 0.044 0.438 0.683
within 0.127 0.242 1.166
Precipitation2 overall 0.355 0.168 0.047 1.435
(meter2) between 0.053 0.199 0.483
within 0.159 0.035 1.369
Moderate Heat overall 1.691 0.229 1.073 2.372
(thousand degree-day) between 0.191 1.338 2.198
within 0.127 1.369 2.054
Extreme Heat overall 0.186 0.165 0.000 0.974
(hundred degree-day) between 0.096 0.059 0.473
within 0.135 -0.152 0.867
N=6780; n=339; T=20
Notes: Table 3.2 represents summary statistics of the 20-year county level panel for
all counties in the Corn Belt with crop concentration level (defined in subsection 3.4)
above 75%. Overall sample mean, overall, between and within variance, minimum
and maximum are reported for key measures.
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with first-stage equation of
Insi,t = α0+α1post1995t+α2year1995t×Hi,t−1+α3Hi,t−1+α4Wi,t+fi(t)+γiEi+µi,t
(3.13)
In equation 3.12, the dependent variable is fertilizer use (Ferti,t) measured by the
logarithm of total N and P application. The explanatory variable of interest is crop
insurance enrollment rate (Insi,t) measured by fraction of cropland with insurance
regardless of contract type and coverage level. The parameter of interest is β1, which
gives percent change in fertilizer use if enrolled in crop insurance. Wi,t is a vector
of contemporaneous weather variables that controls for impact of current weather
events on farmers’ decision on fertilizer application. gi(t) is a vector of normalized
county-specific time trends that controls for time-variant factors, such as changes in
human capital, technology and other economic and social trends. Di is a vector of
county fixed effects that controls for time-invariant effect factors, such as long-term
climate and soil characteristics. εi,tis an error term that includes all other factors that
influence fertilizer application.
Because insurance and fertilizer application decision are likely to be decided simul-
taneously or with substantial forward or backward feedbacks, Insi,t is endogenous.
This endogeneity issues is addressed in equation 3.13 by applying the instrumental
variable approach. In particular, the endogenous variable is instrumented by the pol-
icy change of FCIRA policyt, lagged extreme heat shocks Hi,t−1 and differential initial
responses to the policy due to past weather shocks across counties year1995t×Wi,t−1
in equation 3.13. Because the exact timing of the implementation of FCIRA could
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not be predicted by farmers and previous weather shocks are unlikely to persist to
influence fertilizer decision via channels other insurance decisions, the FE-TSLS es-
timates of β1 should provide unbiased estimates of β1. Intuitively, only variations in
insurance that are associated with policy change, past weather shocks and differential
response to policy change due to past weather are used to estimate the effect of in-
surance on fertilizer application in the FE-TSLS model. County-specific time trends
fi(t) and county fixed effects Ei are also controlled for in the first stage.
The categorical variable policyt takes three statuses: pre-1994, 1995 and post-
1996. Heavy premium subsidies in the Federal Crop Insurance Program was first
made available in 1995 cropping season, during which it was mandatory to enroll in
at least the fully subsidized “CAT” level which pays for the losses exceeding 50% yield
loss at 55% of predicted market price. This provision of premium subsidy combined
with the mandatory requirement dramatically boosted crop insurance enrollment rate
in the Corn Belt in 1995. The mandatory enrollment requirement was lifted in the
subsequence years, and there was a sharp drop in insurance enrollment in 1996 as a
result. However, the effect of heavy premium subsidies remained robust and insurance
enrollment rate was substantially higher after 1996 than prior to 1994.
The interacting terms of lagged extreme heatHi,t−1 with dummy for 1995 year1995t
gives differential initial responses to the policy due to past extreme heat shocks across
counties. Extreme heat is shown to be very harmful to crop yields. Yields for corn and
soybean decrease sharply as degree-days above 30 degree Celsius increases (Schlenker
and Roberts, 2009). Prospect theory states that individuals have uncertainty bias
and tend to underestimate the probability of a likely loss, thus under-purchase in-
surance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If a farmer experiences an adverse weather
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shock, the farmer is more likely to purchase insurance in the following year. It is also
expected that if a county experiences an adverse weather shock the year prior to the
implementation of FCIRA, it is likely to have a stronger response to the policy as
the adverse event acted as a reminder of likelihood of loss occurring. Lagged extreme
heat variables Hi,t−1 are also included as instruments.
Detailed description of sample selection criteria dependent variable Ferti,t, en-
dogenous variable Insi,t, and the vector of weather variables Wi,t are presented in
section 3.4. Figure 3.5.1 (a) presents the average N and P fertilizer use and Figure
3.5.1 (b) presents the average crop insurance enrollment rate in the sample counties
from 1987 to 2006. Average fertilizer use for N and in P show no breaks in trends
around the policy time. Meanwhile, average crop enrollment rate more than doubled
from 1994 to 1995, increasing from 34% to 73% when premium subsidies and manda-
tory requirement of enrollment were both in place. Enrollment rate experienced a
sharp decrease to 56% in 1996 after the mandatory requirement was expelled.
3.6 Results and Discussion
3.6.1 First-stage Results
Table 3.3 presents the first stage results. The dependent variable is fraction of crop-
land with crop insurance and the independent variables are dummy for year 1995,
dummy for years after 1995, lagged extreme heat and the interaction term of dummy
for year 1995 and lagged extreme heat. Current weather, county fixed effects and
time trends at various levels are controlled. Columns (a) include all years in the


























































































































time trends and county-specific time trends respectively. Columns (3) are most flex-
ible and is the preferred specification. Column (b3) and column (c3) include 5 and
3 years before and after FCIRA respectively, and are used as robustness check. F
statistics for joint significance of all instruments are all greater than 10. There is no
sign of weak instrument problems in any models.
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 successfully boosted crop enrollment.
Based on column (a3) model, the baseline increase in crop enrollment in 1995, when
premium at CAT level were fully subsidized and enrollment was mandatory, were
estimated to be 32.0 percentage points comparing to before 1995 without the policy.
Increase in crop enrollment after 1995, when premium at CAT level were fully subsi-
dized but enrollment was no longer mandatory, were estimated to be 22.9 percentage
points. There was a statistically significant drop of 9.1 percentage points from 1995.
Extreme heat shocks in the previous years significantly impact crop enrollment re-
sponse to the policy. The coefficient in front of the interaction term indicates that
there was an additional increase of 0.89 percentage point increase in fraction of crop-
land with crop insurance for each degree-day above 30 degree Celsius above county
average in 1994. All these results are significant at the 1% confidence level and are
robust across various length of the study period.
Previous extreme heat shock shows a significant impact in the full sample analysis.
For each degree-day above 30 degree Celsius above county average, crop insurance
enrollment in the following year increases by 0.16 percentage point. This effect is
significant at the 1% confidence level. However, such effect does not persist when
shorter periods before and after FRCIA are included. This indicates that the signifi-
cant lagged effect of extreme heat is driven by the years before 1990, and most likely,
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by the severe drought that affected most of the US in 1988.
3.6.2 Second-stage Results
Impact of crop insurance on fertilizer use is predicted to be negative in Section 3.3.
Figure 3.6.1 presents graphic evidence of the negative correlation between crop insur-
ance enrollment and fertilizer application before, during and after the policy change
in 1994-1995. Spatial distributions of fraction of cropland insured, N and P fertil-
izer use per acre are presented. Across each year, areas with higher crop insurance
enrollment rates uses less fertilizer. The sharp increase in 1995 and the sharp drop
in 1996 in crop enrollment also coincide with sharp decrease and sharp increase in N
fertilizer use across sample counties. P usage is less heterogeneous spatially. In areas
with high level of P application, decrease application in 1995 and increase in 1996 are
evident.
Table 3.4 presents FE-TSLS estimators of the impact of crop insurance enrollment
on N and P fertilizer application. Four dependent variables are used:
1) logarithm of total N fertilizer applied in a county,
2) logarithm of total P fertilizer applied in a county,
3) intensity of N fertilizer application measured by total fertilizer divided by aver-
age cropland in census year between 1987 to 2007, and
4) intensity of P fertilizer application measured by total fertilizer divided by aver-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.6.1: Change of Fertilizer Use and Crop Insurance Enrollment around Policy
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The main results of interests are coefficients for the logarithms, which measures per-
cent change in total fertilizer use as a result of crop insurance enrollment. The
intensity measures are presented as robustness checks.
For comparison purpose, fixed effects (FE) models for Equation 3.12 are also
estimated and reported in Table 3.4 column (r). Current weather, county fixed effects
and county-specific time trends are controlled in the FE model. The FE estimators
have positive signs, but are tightly bounded around zeros. FE estimators are biased
toward zeros due to endogeneity of Insi,t.
Enrolling in crop insurance has significant negative impact on N fertilizer applica-
tion. In the preferred model, total N fertilizer application decreased 18.5% if enrolled
in crop insurance. The intensity of N application decreased 5.8 kilograms per acre
of average total cropland when enrolled in crop insurance, which is a 17.1% decrease
comparing to the sample average of 33.9 kilograms per acre of average total cropland.
All the coefficients are significant at the 1% confidence level. P fertilizer application
was not statistically significant impacted by crop insurance enrollment. These results
are robust across controls of various time trends as well as inclusion of various length
of study period.
3.6.3 Discussion
The difference in fertilizer application responses to the change of economic incentives
introduced by the Federal Crop Insurance Program between N and P fertilizer is
expected. The explanations are rooted in the natural processes of N and P in the soil
and the history of nutrients management in the US agriculture2.
2The explanations of the natural processes use the standard soil science textbook The Nature















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Phosphorus has a multi-year soil residual time. Phosphorus fertilizer applied
to soils which are below its P-fixation capacity quickly turn into insoluble forms
via a P-fixation process and are slowly released over several years. This fixation
reaction in the soil may allow only 10 to 15% of P applied in fertilizers to be used by
crops in the year of application in soils with low P availability. In the US, farmers
has been overcompensating the low initial P availability in the soils for decades.
Most soils in the Corn Belt are at its P-fixation capacity, in other words, saturated
with P. Crop P need are met by the natural releasing of insoluble P, thus there is
little relationship between yield responses to P fertilizer the current year. This weak
relationship between yield and P fertilizer leaves P fertilizer application decision not
responsive to economic incentives, and explains why no significant impact of crop
insurance enrollment on P fertilizer application was found. In practice, the amount
of P fertilizer applied are predetermined based on soil tests. Only maintenance P are
advised to compensate for the loss during crop harvesting unless soil tests show P
deficiency.
On the other hand, N has a very short soil residual time. Nitrogen, supplied
in commercial fertilizers in the forms of ammonium (NH+4 ) and nitrate (NO
−
3 ), are
readily moved with water and taken up by plants. It is assumed that any soil body has
an equilibrium content of N in any given combination of climate and farming system.
Any short-term attempts of rising N content above equilibrium content of N would be
quickly lost before it may be used. The primary purpose of N fertilizer application is to
close the gap between crop N requirement and N supplied by the soils, not building up
N in the soil. Therefore, N supply for the crop needs to be replenished every cropping
season and there is a clear yield response to N fertilizer before the gap was closed.
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This strong relationship between yield and N fertilizer leaves N fertilizer application
decision very responsive to economic incentives, and explains the significant impact
of crop insurance enrollment on N fertilizer application as predicted in Section 3.3.
3.7 Conclusion and Policy Implication
This paper finds significant decrease in N fertilizer application as a results of crop
insurance enrollment in the Corn Belt. While water quality data are not available,
decrease in N fertilizer use is likely to have significant positive effect on water quality.
Since most NPS are caused by runoff of water soluble fertilizer such as nitrates before
it was taken up by crops. Decrease of “insurance application” in an average year can
have a significant impact on the amount of excess fertilizer.
These findings demonstrate that public programs that alter economic incentives
of individuals can have significant knock-on effects via the channel of private profit
optimization. The FCIRA of 1994 was designed to increase crop insurance enrollment
and eliminate the needs for federal disaster relief transfer in catastrophic years. This
study shows that the primary goal of FCIRA was achieved successfully with drastic
increase in crop insurance take-up, and that the knock-on effect of reducing source of
NPS pollution is also substantial.
The findings of this paper echoes with the conclusion from theoretical studies
that a mix of economic incentives should be used to target agricultural NPS pollu-
tion, and adds that an effective policy mix should include a broad view of economic
incentives, including both incentives targeting and not targeting NPS discharge. Fur-
ther, effective design of economic incentive programs in regulating agricultural NPS
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pollution should be rooted in understanding of natural process of the pollutants in
the ecosystem.
The benefit of agricultural NPS pollution control has not attracted much attention
in the debate of benefits and drawbacks of Federal Crop Insurance Programs, because
of the ambiguous empirical evidence from previous studies. Meanwhile, privatization
and downsizing of FCIP are on the agenda (Coble and Barnett, 2013; Goodwin and
Smith, 2013). Although the total social welfare of subsiding crop insurance to achieve
agricultural NPS pollution reduction is unclear, the knock-on effect of FCIP is an
important piece of agricultural NPS, given the sizable impact found in this study and
the lack of any other effect policy instrument in regulating agricultural NPS. Further
study on social welfare of this knock-on effect with an estimation of environmental
impact of scaling back crop insurance subsides are recommended.
96
Chapter 4
Introducing Index Insurance into
Traditional Insurance Markets:
Advantageous Selection and
Reversal of Moral Hazard
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4.1 Background
4.1.1 Selection in Insurance Markets
Adverse selection describes the prediction that high risk individuals are likely to pur-
chase insurance of higher coverage level because they have private information on
the size or the probability of of losses that is not available to insurance underwriters.
This selection problem in insurance markets was first theorized in the seminal work of
Arrow (1963), Pauly (1974b), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and then extended
to various directions covering monopoly, competitive contracts and multi-period con-
tracts. Dionne et al. (2012) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on
the theories. The bottom line is that theories predict a testable positive relationship
between risk and coverage level due to adverse selection.
Empirical tests for adverse selection are abundant, yet they have yielded mixed
results from various markets. For example, no clear empirical evidence for risk-
coverage relationship was found in the automobile insurance nor the life insurance
markets so far (Puelz and Snow, 1994; Richaudeau, 1999; Chiappori et al., 2006;
Cohen, 2005). Yet, evidence for adverse selection was found prominent in the annuities
markets (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). Alma and Siegelman (2009) reviewed a wide
range of empirical studies and concluded that the existence or absence of risk-coverage
relationship predicted by theories depends on two key factors. One is the validity of
the assumption that policy holders have and are able to exploit the private information
about their own risk exposure. And the other is the presence of propitious selection
which refers to that low risk individual are also selected into high coverage group
due to high risk-aversion and other factors associated with the tendency to purchase
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insurance, thus offsets the positive risk-coverage relationship resulted from adverse
selection of high risk individual.
More interestingly, advantageous selection, the opposite to adverse selection, are
found empirically. Cawley and Philipson (1999) found in the UK life insurance mar-
ket that mortality is lower for those with life insurance and premium actually falls
with quality purchase, a likely results policyholders’ inability of predicting their own
demise. Meza and Webb (2001) theorized that positive administrative cost and a
positive correlation between precaution and insurance purchase can result in advan-
tageous selection and explain such empirical findings.
Along this line of literature, this paper explores the selection problem when mul-
tiple insurance contracts are presented. In particular, it asks how the present of an
index-based contract option with basis risk induces selection problem in the tradi-
tional individual-outcome-based insurance market in the context of the Federal Crop
Insurance Program in the United States. The theory of part of this paper predicts
that low risk individuals will self-select into index-based insurance leaving the pool
of individual-based contracts more risky. It also predicts that moral hazard which is
presented in the individual insurance market will be reduced. Both predictions are
then tested empirically with a county-level dataset.
4.1.2 Group Insurance in the Federal Crop Insurance Pro-
gram
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 offered farmers nationwide a standing
“catastrophic” level of protection for a small administrative fee. Participation in the
Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) soared in 1995. While participation scaled
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back after the repeal of the provision that made crop insurance a prerequisite for
receipt of agriculture program benefits in 1996, participation remained well above the
50 percent goal set by Congress in the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (United
States General Accounting Office, 1993). The overall policy environment remained
stable from 1996 till 2000, when the Agricultural Risk Protection Act was passed
with increased subsidy provision for most “buy-up” coverage levels.
Between 1996 and 2000, the only substantial change in the FCIP is the introduc-
tion of some new types of insurance programs. They were made available as an alter-
native to the traditional Actual Production History (AHP), which is a yield-guarantee
contract based on individual yield history. Individual-based revenue plans, such as
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Revenue Assurance (RA), were introduced. More
interestingly, Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP)
were introduced to counties at various points in time. This phase-in introduction of
group insurance forms the bases of the difference-in-difference identification strategy.
Group Risk Plan and GRIP are multiple peril insurance programs1. Unlike AHP
and other yield or revenue insurance programs available at the time, GRP and GRIP
are based on county average yields rather than the actual yield of the farm or insured
unit. Thus, GRP and GRIP do not require individual yield history to be eligible,
and past farm level loss does not affect premiums of these policy. However, GRP
and GRIP offers incomplete protection. Farmers are only protected when the county
average yield is low. Therefore, there is a positive probability that a farmer could
suffer a loss but the insurance does no payout based on county average. Such risk
1GRP and GRIP for corn and soybean are explained in details by William Edwards from Iowa
State University Extension and Outreach https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/crops/
html/a1-58.html
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are call basis risk in the context of index insurance. Group Risk Plan and GRIP are
most suited for farmers whose yield history track closely with the county-average, and
those who can afford a large loss in one year given the basis risk. From the perspective
of advantageous selection, farmers with private information that they are less risky
than the county average are most likely to sign-up for the group-based insurance.
Intuitively, because of basis risk, only low risk farmers who can profit off the basis
risk would have the incentive to enroll in group insurance when both are presented.
Take a step further, index insurance is less subjective to moral hazard, which is
ubiquitous in indemnity insurance market. Index insurance payouts are decoupled
from individual outcomes, leaving little room for farmers to distort a situation for
collecting insurance benefits. While this is easily proved theoretically, there is no
empirical evidence that I know of demonstrating it. The introduction of group insur-
ance plans based on county average yield in an otherwise stable policy environment
between 1996 and 2000 in the United States offers a unique empirical setting to test
whether moral hazard is reduced when index insurance become available.
This chapter builds upon the findings from chapter 3 that counties in the Corn
Belt where cropland is dominated by corn and soybean production showed an 18%
decrease in commercial nitrogen (N) fertilizer use when enrolled in crop insurance.
Such decrease in Nitrogen fertilizer use, while offering environmental benefit of non-
point source pollution reduction, is a strong demonstration of ex ante moral hazard.
If, as theory predicts, index insurance do not distort behaviors, we could expected
nitrogen fertilizer to increase, as the reversal of moral hazard occurs, when group
insurance is available and adopted by farmers.
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4.2 Conceptual Framework
This model is is an extension of the model presented in chapter 3 section 3.3. I
adopt the same yield response function y = Y (N, r) as in equation 3.2 and the
same rainfall probability density function f(r) as in equation 3.3. Two types of
insurance are discussed here. One is an individual-based yield insurance, which share
the same payout structure as defined in equation 3.1. The other is a group-based yield
insurance, whose payout structure does not perfectly reflect production risk faced
by an individual farmer and are not influenced by individual production choices.
Subsection 4.2.1 presents detailed assumptions of the group insurance. Subsection
4.2.2 solves farmer’s optimization problem under group insurance, and shows that
there is no moral hazard with group insurance. Subsection 4.2.3 discusses conditions
in which farmers would switch to group insurance when both traditional indemnity
insurance and group insurance are available. Finally, subsection 4.2.4 presents what
to be expected as a macro-level given farmers’ individual heterogeneity, providing
testable hypothesis using county-level data.
4.2.1 Model Setup
A group-based insurance that based on county average yield would make up for the
gap between X and the realized county average yield if the county average falls below
the guaranteed level X, and would not payout if the county average yield is greater
than X regardless of the realized yield y for an individual farm. It is assumed that
the realized county average yield is positively correlated to individual yield realized
given the rainfall distribution in equation 3.3. In particular, there are 5 possible
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outcomes for an individual farmer in any given year, where γL and γM are subjective
probability:
1. when RH is realized with probability p giving individual yield response to fer-
tilizer y = Y (N,RH), county average yield is greater than X with certainty.
2. when RM is realized with probability (1−p−q) giving individual yield response
to fertilizer y = Y (N,RM), county average yield reflect individual outcome with
probability γM . Insurance does not pay.
3. when RM is realized with probability (1−p−q) giving individual yield response
to fertilizer y = Y (N,RM), county average would be low y
g = Y gL and trigger
insurance payout of X − Y gL with probability (1− γM).
4. when RL is realized with probability p giving individual yield response to fertil-
izer y = Y (N,RL), county average yield reflect individual outcome with prob-
ability γL and trigger insurance payout of X − Y gL .
5. when RL is realized with probability q giving individual yield response to fer-
tilizer y = Y (N,RL), county average yield would be fail to reflect individual
losses with a realization of Y gM , and insurance does not payout with probability
1− γM .
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4.2.2 Optimization with Group Insurance
A farmer with group insurance faces the following optimization problem
max
N∈[0,N ]
EGrpIns(π) = p ∗ Y (N,RH) + (1− p− q) ∗ Y (N,RM) + q ∗ Y (N,RL)+
[(1− p− q) ∗ (1− γM) + q ∗ γL](X − Y gL )− P ∗N (4.1)
where, Y gL is a realization of county average yield that is below the insurance coverage
X. Plug yield response function equation 3.2 into equation 4.1 and take the first order
condition. The optimal fertilizer application with group insurance is
N∗GrpIns = Φ(pR
β











1−α . Notice that the first three terms here are identical to the first
three terms in equation 3.4 and the forth term is a constant. Chapter 2 section 3
shows that optimal level of fertilizer application N∗ with and without insurance are
N∗noIns = Φ(pR
β














Group insurance does not alter farmer’s incentive of using fertilizer to achieve op-
timal yield regardless of realized rainfall. This model predicts that a farmer will
increase fertilizer use to the optimal level when without insurance or when switching
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This result is independent from assumptions on basis risk γL and γM and assumption
on group insurance payout X − Y ∗L . It is robust as long as individual farmer cannot
influence group insurance payout.
4.2.3 Group Insurance as an Alternative
When being presented with options of traditional indemnity insurance and group
insurance based on county average yield, a farmer who is enrolled in traditional in-
demnity insurance would switch to group insurance if the expected profit with optimal
level of fertilizer is greater with group insurance than with traditional indemnity in-








Since optimal choice of fertilizer is the same with no insurance and with group insur-
ance, it is easiest to use the no insurance condition as the baseline condition when
comparing choices among 1) not enroll in any insurance, 2) enroll in individual in-
surance, and 3) enrolled in group insurance. Rearranging terms in equation 4.6 and
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using N∗noIns = N
∗
GrpIns from equation 4.5,
(1− p− q) ∗ [(1− γM) + q ∗ γL](X − Y gL )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term I
>
− p ∗ (Y (N∗noIns, RH)− Y (N∗Ins, RH))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term II
−(1− p− q) ∗ (Y (N∗noIns, RM)− Y (N∗Ins, RM))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term III
+ q ∗ (X − Y (N∗noIns, RL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term IV
> 0 (4.7)
where Term I is the expected payout of group insurance; Term II and III are nu-
merically positive and are the loss due to moral hazard when rainfall is favorable or
normal; and Term IV is the payout of traditional indemnity insurance when rainfall
is bad. The part before the first greater-than sign is the additional benefit of en-





noIns), the part between the two greater-than sign is the additional benefit





noIns), which is the expected payout from traditional indemnity insurance mi-
nus the expected loss with reduced fertilizer due to moral hazard when rainfall is
favorable or normal. Figure 4.2.1 offers a graphic representation of Term II, Term III
and Term IV.
Intuitively, a farmer would switch to group insurance if the expected additional
benefit of enrolling in group insurance compared to no insurance condition is greater
than that of enrolling individual insurance. Notice Term I must be positive by def-
inition, thus enrolling in group insurance is strictly better than not having insur-
ance under any conditions. While EGrpIns(N
∗
GrpIns) − EnoIns(N∗noIns) may be nega-




GrpIns)− EnoIns(N∗noIns) > 0.
To summarizer, a farmer
Category (A) would not enroll in individual insurance when group insurance is not offered, if
EIns(N
∗
Ins)− EnoIns(N∗) < 0.
Category (B) would enroll in individual insurance when group insurance is not offered and






Ins)− EnoIns(N∗) > 0.
Category (C) would stay enrolled in individual insurance when group insurance is offered, if
EGrpIns(N
∗
Ins)− EnoIns(N∗) < EIns(N∗)− EnoIns(N∗).
where EGrpIns(N
∗





Ins) − EnoIns(N∗) = −p ∗ (Y (N∗noIns, RH) − Y (N∗Ins, RH)) − (1 − p − q) ∗
(Y (N∗noIns, RM)− Y (N∗Ins, RM)) + q ∗ (X − Y (N∗noIns, RL).
4.2.4 Predictions at the County Level
To conceptualized sources of individual heterogeneity that determines which category
a farmer may belong, resilience to drought conditions is considered. Resilience to
drought conditions dependents on soil types and can be built by sustainable soil health
management practices such as no-till and use of cover crops over time. Resilience to
drought conditions is reflected in the shape of Y (N,RL) and basis risk (γL, γM), which
driver the categorization via Term I and Term IV2.
2Expected losses due to moral hazard (p ∗TermII + (1− p− q) ∗TermIII) are assumed to not be
the deciding factors in the categorization. The size of Term I and Term II depends on the shape of
Y (N, r) = ANαrβ , which can exhibit some individual heterogeneity within a county. Recall from
chapter 3 that long-term optimal N∗noIns is greater than optimal N
∗
M when rainfall is known to be
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Figure 4.2.1: Received Yields with Optimal Fertilizer Level
Notes: Figure 4.2.1 compares gain and losses of enrolling individual insurance program
when RH , RM and RL are realized. Refer to Figure ?? for color codes. Received yield
in each rainfall realization when enrolled in individual insurance plan is marked by
hollow black dots on the yield response curves and by black dashed lines. Received
yield in each rainfall realization without insurance is marked by hollow green dots
on the yield response curves and by green dashed lines. The different between using
N∗Ins and N
∗ are the gaps between the green dashed lines and the black dashed lines.
Losses are marked with thick red lines (Term II and Term III) and the gain is marked
with thick green line (Term IV).
108
When a soil is healthy and is of high water holding capacity, more plant available
water can be supplied by the soil even in low rainfall situations, thus realized yield
Y (N,RL) is greater at all N level. The gap between between X and Y (N,RL)) is
small, and the expected benefit from individual insurance, which is Term IV, is small.
At the same time, comparing to county average yield, the probability of this farmer
suffering a loss when county average yield is above X is low, 1 − γL is small; the
probability of this farmers does not suffer a loss while the county average yield is
below X is high, γM is large. Thus, the expected benefit of enrolling group insurance,
which is Term I, is large. Such farmer would meet EGrpIns(N
∗
Ins) − EnoIns(N∗) >
EIns(N
∗
Ins)− EnoIns(N∗) > 0 condition and be in Category B.
At a macro-level, as long as there are some individuals belong to Category B,
“advantageous selection” would occur in the group insurance market, leaving the
average individual insurance taker more risky. Farmers that belong to Category B
would increase fertilizer use from N∗Ins to N
∗, which would reflect in an increased
overall use of fertilizer. The empirical part of this paper tests the hypothesis:
I Enrollment in individual plans decreased when group insurance was introduced.
II Fertilizer use increased proportional to the decrease of enrollment in individual
plan by a factor of 18%, which is the magnitude of moral hazard estimated in
Chapter 3.
RM . Term II is small, thus, (1− p− q) ∗ Term II is likely to be small. Further, while Term III can
be more sizable than Term II, but favorable rainfall RH occurs with a small probability of p, thus
p ∗ Term III is still likely to be small. Thus the heterogeneity in Term II and Term III is limited in
driving the decision of switching to group insurance from individual insurance. While it is unclear,
how soil health and resilience to drought could impact Term II and Term III, the impact is most
likely to be small.
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4.3 Empirical Study
4.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this chapter are similar to the ones in chapter 3 section 3.4. Counties
in the Corn Belt with corn and soybean as the dominant crops are selected based on
crop concentration measures. Commercial fertilizer data are taken from National
Water-Quality Assessment Program (NWQAP) and logarithm of fertilizer use are
examined as a dependent variable to test Hypothesis II. Precipitation, squared term
of precipitation, moderate and extreme heat measured in degree-days are used as
weather controls.
There are some differences between data used here and in Chapter 3. First of
all, only data from 1996 to 2000 are used in this study for the stability of overall
policy environment. Second, only commercial nitrogen fertilizer application levels
are used, since significant moral hazard was only found in nitrogen fertilizer use in
chapter 3. Third, more detailed information on contract types provided by Risk
Management Agency (RMA) United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) are
examined. In particular, crop insurance enrollment in individual and group plans are
measured separately by number of acres insured with individual insurance and number
of acres insured with group insurance. Cropland insured in each type of contracts are
approximated by aggregating net reported acres for corn and soybean with individual
or group insurance across contracts and coverage levels3. Logarithm of number of
acres with individual insurance was used as dependent variable to test Hypothesis
3Individual insurance plans include Actual Production History (APH), Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC), Revenue Assurance(RA) and Income Protection(IP). Group insurance plans include Group
Risk Plan(GRP) and Group Income Risk Plan (GRIP).
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I. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the key measures for 399 counties in the
sample between 1996 and 2000.
4.3.2 Difference-in-difference Approach
To test Hypothesis I and Hypothesis II, difference-in-difference approach is used to
estimate the effect of offering group-based insurance contracts as an alternative to
the traditional AHP, by comparing control and treatment counties before and after
the introduction of group-based insurance contracts.
While GRP and GRIP were eventually introduced to all counties in the sample,
they were only introduced to part of the sample during the study period. Figure 4.3.1
presents a bar chart of number of counties in the sample by timing of the introduction
of GRP and GRIP. Group Risk Plan was first introduced in 1997 and GRIP was first
introduced in 1999. Counties with GRP or GRIP introduced before or in 2000 are
assigned into treatment group and counties with GRP or GRIP introduced after 2000
are assigned into control groups. This treatment and control assignment results in
281 counties in the treatment group and 58 counties in the control group with varying
length for pre- and post-treatment depending on the year of initial treatment.





Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Key Measures
Variable(unit) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Nitrogen Fertilizer overall 8487.4 4131.5 333.8 28100.0
(thousand kg) between 4088.0 488.8 25800.0
within 630.2 4346.4 11800.0
Individual Insured overall 140.01 95.03 4.80 526.31
(thousand Acre) between 92.91 5.94 492.08
within 20.45 -68.33 206.69
Facrtion of Land overall 0.0140 0.0410 0.0000 0.5310
with Group Insurance between 0.0332 0.0000 0.3096
within 0.0241 -0.2956 0.2756
Precipitation overall 0.5940 0.1209 0.2871 0.9465
(meter) between 0.0649 0.3924 0.7303
within 0.1021 0.2837 0.8575
Precipitation2 overall 0.3678 0.1470 0.0826 0.8960
(meter2) between 0.0778 0.1557 0.5541
within 0.1248 0.0026 0.7562
Moderate Heat overall 1.6565 0.2242 1.1446 2.3641
(thousand degree-day) between 0.1913 1.2813 2.1809
within 0.1172 1.4186 1.8632
Extreme Heat overall 0.1367 0.1128 0.0024 0.8267
(hundred degree-day) between 0.0907 0.0174 0.4773
within 0.0672 -0.1219 0.5368
N=1695; n=339; T=5
Notes: Table 4.1 represents summary statistics of the 5-year county level panel for
all counties in the Corn Belt with crop concentration level (defined in subsection 3.4)
above 75%. Overall sample mean, overall, between and within variance, minimum
and maximum are reported for key measures.
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Figure 4.3.1: Phase-in of Group-based Insurance Plan (1997-2000)
Notes: Figure 4.3.1 presents a bar chart of number of counties in the sample by timing
of the introduction of GRP and GRIP. Group Risk Plan was first introduced in 1997
and GRIP was first introduced in 1999. Counties with GRP or GRIP introduced
before or in 2000 are assigned into treatment group and counties with GRP or GRIP
introduced after 2000 are assigned into control groups.
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where Treatmenti takes value 1 for counties in the treated group and 0 for counties
in the control group. i indicates individual counties and t indicates event time, which
is normalized to the year when group-based insurance was introduced. Posti,t is an
indicator variable for post-treatment that takes values 1 for positive event time and
takes values 0 otherwise. The coefficient β3 for the interaction term of Treatmenti
and Postt is the coefficient of interests, which is an unbiased estimator for the average
impact of introducing group-based insurance on dependent variables Yi,t.
Enrollment rates in individual insurance plans and application of commercial ni-
trogen fertilizer are dependent variables of interests. Hypothesis I predicts that en-
rollment in individual insurance would drop when group insurance was introduced,
thus β3 would be negative, for farmers in Category B would switch to group insurance.
Hypothesis II predicts that use of commercial nitrogen fertilizer would increase, thus
β3 would be positive, for farmers who switched to group insurance would increase
fertilizer use.
Besides the static estimates of the impact of having group-based insurance as an
alternative, the temporal variation of such impact on individual insurance enrollment




βjTreatmenti ∗ EventT imei,t +
5∑
j=1
βjTreatmenti ∗ EventT imei,t
+ ρWeatheri,t + αiDi + fi(Year) + εi,t (4.9)
where EventT imei,t is the normalized year relative to the introduction of group-based
insurance. The regression includes 8 event years, ranging from 4 years before the
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introduction to 4 years after the introduction. All regressions includes county fixed
effects Di, weather controls Weatheri,t, and county-specific time trends fi(Year),
where Y ear is the calendar year. All standard errors are clustered at the agricultural
district level.
4.3.3 Results and Discussion
Table 4.2 presents difference-in-difference estimates β2 in equation 4.8 for logarithm
of number of acres insured with individual insurance and logarithm of commercial
nitrogen application. The coefficients can be interpreted as percentage change in
individual insurance plan enrollment and percentage change in nitrogen fertilizer use
as a result of group insurance plans being presented as an alternative to the traditional
individual insurance plans. Each set of coefficient and standard errors is estimated
from a separate regression. Column (1) present the model with a general time trend
and without weather controls respectively. Column (3) presents model with weather
controls and calendar year fixed effects. Column (2), (4) and (5) present model
with weather controls and a general, state-specific and county-specific time trends
respectively.
Number of acres enrolled in individual-based insurance plans decrease by 5% when
group-based insurance plans are presented as an alternative. This result is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% confidence level and is robust with various controls for
time trends and with exclusion of weather controls. This decrease verifies Hypothesis
I and implies that there are farmers switching to group insurance plan from individ-
ual insurance plans as the group plans become available. These farmers, belonging
Category B in subsection 4.2.3, are less risky than the average individual insurance
115
Table 4.2: Static Impact of Introducing Group Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Ins ind) -0.0439** -0.0340*** -0.0424*** -0.0521*** -0.0527***
(0.0130) (0.0070) (0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0130)
log(N) 0.0069 0.0146 0.0056 0.0117 0.0041
(0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0179)
Weather Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend(s) General General FE State County
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the agriculture district level (53 clusters).
Significance levels are indicated by *** 1%, ** 5% , * 10%
taker. Instead of “adverse selection” in traditional indemnity insurance, there is
“advantageous selection” occurring in index insurance. Farmers who have less risky
outcomes than average are self-selected into the group-based insurance, leaving the
pool of individual insurance more risky.
Changes in nitrogen fertilizer use due to the introduction of group-based insur-
ance is consistently positive across all models, and the magnitude of the positive
effect ranges from less than 1% to just over 1%. While this result is not statistically
significant, it is meaningful. It is estimated in Chapter 3 that farmers use 18% less
nitrogen fertilizer when enrolled in insurance. This 18% decrease is the estimated
difference between N∗ and N∗Ins. Test for Hypothesis I identifies that about 5% of
insured land belongs to farmers in Category B, who are expected to increase fertilizer
use from N∗Ins to N
∗. A back-of-envelop calculation estimates an increase in fertilizer
use of 0.9% (= 18% * 5%), which falls in the range of the difference-in-difference
estimates. The lack of statistical significance of difference-in-difference estimators for
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such increases is a likely result of the combination of the expected small magnitude
and noises in the data.
In addition to the static impact of group-based insurance as an alternative, tem-
poral variation of such impact are also estimated and reported in Table 4.3. Figure
4.3.2 plots the temporal heterogeneity of such impact with estimated βjs and their
95% confidence intervals for enrollment in individual plans and nitrogen fertilizer
use following equation 4.9. The validity of difference-in-difference relies on the par-
allel path assumption that the treatment and control group share the same trend
before the treatment. Figure 4.3.2 panel (a) and (b) show that βj for j < 0 are not
statistically significant for either individual insurance enrollment or nitrogen fertil-
izer use, indicating that there is no significant difference before the introduction of
group-based insurance between treatment and control. Further, Panel (a) shows an
increasing trend in the magnitude of βj for individual insurance enrollment in positive
event time. The impact of offering of group insurance as an alternative on individual
insurance enrollment increases over time. Similarly, the impact on nitrogen fertilizer
also seem to increase over time in Panel (b), although βj for fertilizer in positive event
time is not statistically significant and there are only three post-treatment periods.
The increase in the impact of offering group-based insurance as an alternative
is most likely an result of an increasing take-up rate of group insurance over time.
Figure 4.3.3 plots the average percentage of insured land with group insurance in
treated counties over event time in the sample. Figure 4.3.4 Panel (b) plots the
average percentage of insured land with group insurance nationwide from 1989 to
2006. The increasing trend in Figure 4.3.4 Panel (b) results from the combination















































































Table 4.3: Temporal Heterogeneous Impact of Group Insurance as an Alternative
(1) (2)
log(Ins Ind) log(N)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,−3 0.0111 0.0035
(0.0367) (0.0305)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,−2 -0.0234 -0.0133
(0.0215) (0.0171)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,−1 -0.0153 0.0135
(0.0162) (0.0105)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,1 -0.0343** 0.0018
(0.0173) (0.0096)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,2 -0.0511*** 0.0175
(0.0188) (0.0105)
Treatmenti∗EventT imei,3 -0.0779*** 0.0182
(0.0336) (0.0284)
Weather Controls Yes Yes
Time Trend(s) County County
County FE Yes Yes
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Figure 4.3.3: Group Insurance Enrollment in Event Time
plan and an increasing of take-up in group insurance over event time.
4.4 Conclusion
Using a simple yield insurance framework and assuming farmer’s are profit maximiz-
ing entities, this study predicts theoretically that when index insurance is offered, low
risk individuals will self-selected into group insurance contracts, because they have
private information that their risk is lower than the group average and can benefit
from basis risks. This advantageous selection into group based insurance will increase
the overall risk in the traditional insurance pool. In addition, since index insurance
is not subjective to moral hazard, behavior distortions due to moral hazard are pre-
dicted to reverse proportionally to the reduction in individual insurance enrollment


















































































































































































































































































































This study finds empirically that individual insurance enrollment decreased by
5% when group crop insurance whose payout is based on county average yield were
offered as an alternative to individual yield based insurance contracts with statistical
significance. This implies that among the farmers who signed up for the individual
insurance when group insurance was not available, 5% of them are of sufficiently
low risk and could benefit from basis risk because their yield are likely to be above
average in a bad year. Combined with finding from Chapter 3 that nitrogen fertilizer
use decreased 18% when farmers are enrolled in individual insurance plan with heavily
subsidized premiums, fertilizer use is expected to increase about 1%, yet the empirical
results are not statistically significant.
One caveat of this study is that county-level data does not provide information
on heterogeneity at farm-level, thus this study is not able to show direct evidence
that farmers who choose group insurance when both individual and group insurance
are presented are of lower risk. However, the US crop insurance scheme is subject
to selection due to private information, or rather, insurers’ inability to fully incorpo-
rate risk information in the insurance contracts due to institutional setup are both
theoretically and intuitively not unexpected. In addition, a previous study by Makki
and Somwaru (2001) used farm level data of 60,000 corn farms in Iowa for the 1997
crop year, and showed that crop insurance is subject to the selection problem and
that low-risk farmers are over-charged and high-risk farmers are under-charged for
comparable insurance contracts. It would be of great interest to conduct a study that
tracks the evolution of individual insurance choices and how changes in insurance
choices are related to individual risk profile and the availability of insurance contract
options if a farm-level panel dataset was available.
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The findings of this paper call attention to the selection problem when a new
type of insurance contract is brought into policy holders’ choice set. In the context
of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, advantageous selection into group insurance
can leave overall risk in the traditional insurance pool higher and basis risk can be
exploited in group insurance, thus increasing the loss ratio in both insurance pools.
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